


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A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THREE MAIN
ISSUES AFFECTING UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

⑩ John C. Conlin, III, Captain, USAF
John R. Luce, Captain, USAF

⑭ AFLT- LSSR-29-79A

⑬ J. R. Luce
⑬ - 1/4

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
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
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
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1. REPORT NUMBER LSSR 29-79A	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THREE MAIN ISSUES AFFECTING UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis
7. AUTHOR(s) John C. Conlin III, Captain, USAF John R. Luce, Captain, USAF		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Graduate Education Division School of Systems and Logistics Air Force Institute of Technology, WPAFB OH		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Department of Research and Administrative Management AFIT/LSGR, WPAFB OH 45433		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE June 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 201
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) JOSEPH P. HIPPS, Major, USAF Director of Information 		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The Arab-Israeli Conflict U.S. Relations with Israel Middle East Oil Middle East Issues The Soviet Threat in the Middle East		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Thesis Chairman: Richard T. Taliaferro		

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is an instrument of foreign policy in the Middle East. The number of DOD personnel who are involved either directly or indirectly with the Middle East has grown significantly in recent years. These DOD personnel should find a usefulness in a study analyzing the main issues affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East. This study began with a historical examination of the creation of Israel and early United States involvement in the Middle East. From this examination, three main issues affecting United States foreign policy emerged. These issues were the Arab-Israeli conflict, the importance of Middle East oil, and the Soviet threat. The authors demonstrated how these three issues have been the primary forces shaping United States foreign policy in the Middle East.

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A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THREE MAIN ISSUES
AFFECTING UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in International Logistics

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June 1979

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This thesis, written by

Captain John C. Conlin III

and

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has been accepted by the undersigned on behalf of the
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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS

DATE: 13 June 1979



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

In the dynamic nature of world politics today, fortunes of nations are built on their ability to formulate and conduct effective foreign policy. Although a nation's foreign policy should focus on the present and anticipate the future, any analysis of foreign policy should not be made without investigating the past. It is the past which provides the facts and those facts, in turn, form the basis for the formulation of policy. In this respect, F. Parkinson, a former Assistant Director of the London Institute of World Affairs, stated the importance of historical analysis in foreign affairs when he said:

Theorising on the subject of international relations with one's back turned on the past is bound to be a wasteful exercise, as history presents a treasure-house of both experience and ideas. In the field of the study of international relations, conventional diplomatic history has taken care of the former, while the latter has been neglected. Yet, ideas of the past are far from irrelevant to current or future problems of international relations. Judiciously drawn upon, they can be helpful in constructing new theories of international relations, may open minds to fresh thought, and encourage scholars to engage in bold philosophical synthesis of old and new [82:7].

Because the past plays such an important role in shaping current and future United States foreign policy, there is a need for an unclassified, comprehensive historical analysis of the major issues affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an instrument of foreign policy in the Middle East. Those DOD personnel who are involved either directly or indirectly with the Middle East need to recognize that the sum of their actions constitutes an integral part of United States foreign policy implementation. Therefore, it is important that these personnel have an understanding of the major issues affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East.

Justification

It would be difficult indeed to identify all the individuals within the DOD who have some responsibility for Middle East programs. For that matter, the dollar value of all the programs or sales that can be tied directly to the Middle East is not easily determined. The complexity of involvement by the DOD in the Middle East is a major reason for this difficulty. A brief overview in several areas will help convey the complexity of DOD's involvement.

Each of the military departments has organizations that are involved in the Middle East. In the Air Force,

these organizations include the International Logistics Center, System Program Offices (SPO) such as the F-15 SPO, Air Training Command and Tactical Air Command. The Peace Hawk Program for Saudi Arabia, managed by the International Logistics Center, is a 3.5 billion dollar maintenance support and service arrangement (60). This extensive program includes aircraft sales, follow-on support for these aircraft, maintenance and technical training, major construction by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in-country English language training, organizational and intermediate maintenance, and supply modernization (78). Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Middle East countries has been phenomenal. In 1975, the three leading recipients of FMS were Middle East countries. They were Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, respectively. Even the small Middle East country of Kuwait, with a population of approximately 1.2 million people, ranked seventh in receipt of arms through FMS (14:112; 21:7). In 1977, total FMS deliveries to seven Middle East nations amounted to over 5 billion dollars (20:4). Coupled with hardware sales, training is an integral part of a FMS purchase. In support of training, the Air Force's Air Training Command operates four technical training centers which conduct formal classes in such fields as communications equipment repair, aircraft maintenance, and fuels management. Pilot training is conducted by all three military departments. Training in

other areas includes air traffic controller training, professional military training, and engineering and technical services training (78).

Accordingly, one can see that DOD personnel from all military departments in numerous career fields are actively involved in support of Middle East foreign policy through the performance of their daily activities. These people should understand that they play an integral part in Middle East foreign policy implementation, and therefore, they should know the reasons and objectives behind their participation. A historical analysis of how major issues affect United States foreign policy in the Middle East will help explain current United States objectives there. Furthermore, a clearer understanding of current objectives will help those DOD personnel involved in any capacity with the Middle East understand the importance of their role, and possibly enhance their job performance.

Scope

United States foreign policy in the Middle East has been shaped by many issues. For the purpose of this thesis, a historical analysis was conducted in three major areas, each of which has had a major impact on United States foreign policy in the Middle East. These three major areas are: (1) the Arab-Israeli conflict, (2) the oil resources of Middle East countries and (3) the Soviet

threat. Since United States foreign policy has focused upon a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948, a chapter was devoted to a historical development of the creation of Israel. This chapter was necessary to emphasize the importance of key religious issues and historical events that are the fundamental causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Middle East is a large and diversified region. It extends from the Indian Ocean to the Black Sea and encompasses a large portion of Northern Africa. However, only those countries that play a significant role in the three major areas noted above were examined. These countries were Israel, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf states.

Objectives

The primary objectives of this thesis were:

1. To identify through historical analysis key historical events and major religious issues that have contributed to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
2. To provide a comprehensive analysis of how United States foreign policy has been affected by the oil resources of the Middle East.
3. To examine the degree to which the Soviet Union poses a threat to the United States in the Middle East.

Research Questions

In order to achieve the above objectives, the following research questions were answered:

1. How was the Israeli nation-state formed?
2. What role have Islam and Judaism played in the Arab-Israeli conflict?
3. How has the Palestinian refugee problem been interrelated with the Arab-Israeli conflict?
4. What are the policies of the Arabs and Israelis concerning territories seized in the 1967 Six Day War?
5. What role have the major oil companies had in the Middle East?
6. What has been the effect of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) upon United States foreign policy?
7. What has been the significance of the 1973 oil embargo on United States foreign policy?
8. What is the strategic importance of the Middle East to the Soviet Union and the United States?
9. How has the Soviet Union been able to gain political influence in the Middle East?
10. What has been the primary strategy which the United States has used in countering the Soviet threat in the Middle East?

Literature Review

One of the most fascinating, complex, and potentially explosive areas in the world today is the Middle East (38:116). The Middle East is a collection of Third World countries who have captured center stage in world affairs. Three major reasons why these countries have moved to the forefront of world affairs are: (1) the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, (2) their economic impact on the industrialized nations through their potential to withhold oil, and (3) their escalating arms race that involves two major super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Middle East oil nations have created a turning point in world history. They have shifted the world balance of power by showing that weak countries that are rich in essential natural resources could impose their will on the more developed nations possessing greater military and industrial strength (10:90). This literature review shows the important role that the United States plays in Middle Eastern affairs, discusses United States foreign policy in the Middle East, examines the Middle East peace question, shows the importance of Middle East oil, and addresses the Soviet threat.

The United States Role in the Middle East

The United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, and as a world power, is faced with a wide

spectrum of issues and problems in that highly volatile region (47:115). Fundamental changes have taken place in United States foreign policy in the Middle East, making the United States a key actor in the stage of events in that controversial region of the world. Egyptian President Sadat, in June, 1975, recognized the importance of the United States when he said:

All of the cards in this game are in the hands of the United States . . . because they provide Israel with everything and they are the only one who can exert pressure on Israel [Quoted in 18:85].

Prime Minister Begin of Israel also supported the decisive role that the United States has played when he met at Camp David for peace negotiations with President Carter and President Sadat in the fall of 1978. Has the United States actively accepted the desires of key nation-states in the Middle East in helping to secure peace for that part of the world? Indeed she has, as evidenced by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's remarks in May, 1977: "The search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is one of the highest priority items on the foreign policy agenda of our country [18:86]." During the same month, President Carter said that if peace was not obtained it "could mean disaster not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international, political and economic order as well [18:80]." In early 1979, President Carter made a dramatic move for peace when he journeyed to the Middle East to advance stalled peace negotiations

between Egypt and Israel. His efforts were successful and have resulted in a signed treaty between Egypt and Israel that has been ratified by both governments.

United States Foreign Policy
in the Middle East

For the past thirty years, United States Middle Eastern policy has fluctuated, but one central theme is dominant, the survival of Israel. In a speech on November 2, 1977, President Carter emphasized this theme:

We are proud to be Israel's firm friend and closest partner, and we shall stand by Israel always . . . This is one of our deepest felt commitments, and I have no doubt that I speak accurately for the overwhelming portion of the American people, now and forever [Quoted in 114:760].

Recently, the United States has supported this central theme in two ways. First, Israel is supplied with the necessary military support to insure survival. Second, the United States will counter Soviet ventures into the Middle East when those ventures conflict with United States national security. At times, the countering of Soviet influence has meant military and economic aid for Israel's enemies (115:289). Supplying aid for Israel's enemies has caused confusion and misunderstanding. This action appears to conflict with the United States' dominant theme, the support of Israel. Confusion is justified. Senator Edward Kennedy saw the root of confusion in the fact that the Middle East is an area where "American interests are not well-defined, her policies even less so,

and her vision of the future hardly at all [54:15]."

However, Senator Kennedy said the importance of the region was quite definitive: (1) it is a major oil supplier for Europe and Japan, and increasingly for the United States, (2) Middle East nations are close to Soviet Union borders, (3) the continual Arab-Israeli conflict has focused attention in that area, and (4) the Middle East is a growing center of wealth, nationalism, and self-awareness (54:15).

What should be the first priority of United States foreign policy in the Middle East? Should it be the supporting of Israel while striving for a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, or should it be the containment of Soviet influence by increasing the capability of friendly nations to resist Soviet advances? As noted earlier, the Carter administration placed a lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major concern in the Middle East. President Carter emphasized this point in May, 1977:

I would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to the Middle East problem to use the full strength of our own country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement [Quoted in 18:88].

Not all authorities on United States foreign policy envision the Arab-Israeli conflict as the top priority in the Middle East. Eugene V. Rostow and colleagues argued that

curtailing Soviet ambitions in the Middle East was the top priority.

The protracted conflict between Israel and some of her Arab neighbors is not the cause of the Middle Eastern crisis but its symptom and its consequence. The heart of the crisis is the process of Soviet penetration in North Africa and the Near East [93:250].

Determining which of the two priorities, peace for the Arab-Israeli conflict or curtailing Soviet influence, has been emphasized the most is difficult. Presidential and State Department rhetoric have emphasized peace, but actual physical evidence promotes the arming of many nations in the Middle East with United States weapons as a highly pursued policy. United States military sales to the Middle East increased more than ninefold from 1970 to 1974, and the escalation has been increasing (18:92). Michael C. Hudson is another who has argued that containing Soviet influences in the Middle East is the number one priority of United States foreign policy. He stated that the United States desires to regain influence in those Middle Eastern countries leaning toward the Soviets.

But today the most significant aim of American diplomacy is to regain influence in Egypt and Syria and eventually Iraq, and to establish some kind of relations with "moderate" Palestinians [48:480].

It is far beyond the aim of this literature review to decide upon which objective of United States Middle East foreign policy has the greater priority. It is sufficient to say that both are supportable as major objectives of

the United States, without discerning which has priority. Both objectives require further analysis.

The Middle East Peace Question

Under the Carter administration, United States foreign policy in support of a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict has emphasized three points. The first has been an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab land to approximately the 1967 borders. The second urged the creation of a Palestinian homeland, and the third was the establishment of a real and lasting peace between Israel and the Arab nations (18:94; 87:335).

Is peace a futile goal of the Arab-Israeli conflict? Perceptively, Noam Chomsky described the conflict:

International affairs can be complex, a matter of irreconcilable interests, each with a claim to legitimacy, and conflicting principles none of which can be lightly abandoned. The current Middle East crisis is a typical, painful example [93:154].

Chomsky's description of the conflict makes the goal of peace seem almost futile. One way to judge the futility of peace is to survey statements of the competing parties concerning peace. Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia has begun to speak of a complete, permanent peace with Israel, but emphasized the key roadblock to Arab-Israeli peace.

"Palestinian leaders are ready to accept a peaceful solution if it involves establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza [18:56]." President Sadat of Egypt has voiced aspirations for a peace with Israel, and

his government has recently negotiated a peace agreement with Israel. The success of Egyptian and Israeli efforts for peace has not yet been fully realized. Even though Saudi Arabia and Egypt can envision peace with Israel, a total Arab-Israeli peace settlement is not so easily foreseen by all of the Arab participants. Syria and others are much further from peace than Egypt (18:40-41). Saudi Arabia's Deputy Minister of Finance and National Economy, Mansoor Alturki, adequately explained the overall Arab skepticism for a lasting Arab-Israeli peace.

It's an unfortunate thing that happened between the Jews and the Arabs. Having a Jewish state is not at issue. It's a common belief. You see, if they just want a Jewish state I wouldn't see any problem. But the Zionists, the way I understand it, they always want to expand. That is what we are afraid of. That is why there is a lack of confidence in Israel's desire for a settlement [18:55].

Israel strongly desires peace. Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz talked of the type of peace Israel seeks.

Peace as defined by President Carter is not only a declaration--definitely not merely a cessation of a state of war--but rather peace with components of realism in it; of open borders, of exchange of trade, of cultural exchange, of exchange of people, of exchange of tourists, of diplomatic exchange, etc., etc. [18:8].

Bechir Ben Yahmed is a pro-Arab authority who believes that peace in the Middle East is achievable, and that now is the time for achievement (122:133). Most people from all nations hope that peace is near, but the Palestinian question must first be resolved before all Arab nations

will negotiate for peace. The Palestinian question is still far from a workable solution (18:109-122).

The Importance of
Middle East Oil

United States foreign policy in the Middle East has been keenly affected by its energy needs as well as the Arab-Israeli issue. During the decades of the fifties and sixties, the availability of oil greatly outpaced consumption (50:230). Oil was a cheap form of energy, and the United States economy, along with the Western European and the Japanese economies, was dependent upon its use in its rapidly advancing, highly technological industrial base (33:752). Thus, by the late 1970s, the rapidly increasing oil consumption of these industrialized nations made oil even more valuable. Exponential consumption rates placed increasing demand on this depletable resource to the point that oil became a supplier's market (50:230). Increasing United States dependency on Middle East oil, coupled with Arab perception of American partisan support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli issue, placed the United States in a precarious position. By 1973, Saudi Arabia, the United States' closest partner in the Middle East, was in a strong position to demand that:

It would be difficult to continue cooperation with the United States in the petroleum field unless Washington moves toward a more balanced policy in the Middle East [50:237].

Prior to this statement by King Faisal in July, 1973, American policy-makers put little credence in the idea that oil could be used as a political weapon (50:236). Thus, oil has become another key variable in the United States' foreign policy equation for the Middle East, and it is an issue which must be examined carefully and comprehensively.

The Soviet Threat

The oil question and the peace settlement question have had a significant effect on United States foreign policy in the Middle East. However, the more subtle threat, but perhaps a much more serious threat, to the United States today is the Soviet Union. In 1977, former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated:

The major differences between us and the Soviet Union have not been resolved. They still are committed to their world revolution, and will probe at points of weakness. They look upon these notions of freedom as lethal to their kind of system [Quoted in 28:44].

The Soviets have been successful as an influence in the Middle East in two areas. First, since Stalin the Soviets have been able to align their ideology with strong Arab nationalism and "the progressive socialism of various regimes [48:481]." Such is the situation in Iraq and Syria. This influence also existed in Egypt under the Nasser regime, but has deteriorated since Nasser's death. Second, Soviet ideology has had considerable influence

upon the younger, educated members of the Middle East who resent small, traditional ruling groups. For example, the Communist movement has played an active role in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (48:481). One must remember that the oil question affects the Soviet Union as well as the United States. In December, 1977, Secretary of the Air Force, John C. Stetson, stated that the Soviets have been self-sufficient for many years, but by the end of the next decade the Soviet Union will need to look to other parts of the world to meet their growing oil needs. Obtaining Persian Gulf oil through military force or threat of military force and "then denying oil to the free world has certainly occurred to them [41:75]."

This literature review has shown the important role that the United States plays in the Middle East. United States foreign policy was discussed, showing that the survival of Israel has been the central theme shaping that policy. Arab-Israeli peace, the importance of Middle East oil, and the Soviet threat in the Middle East were also examined, showing their influence in shaping United States foreign policy in that region. Clearly, the United States has enduring interests in the Middle East, and as one of the great world powers, it is faced with a wide spectrum of issues and problems in that highly troubled region (47:115). There is every reason to assume that Middle East problems will be with us in the years which

lie ahead. Only by thoroughly analyzing the history behind these problems can one begin to understand United States foreign policy in the Middle East.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

This thesis employed a historical analysis of three major issues affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East through cause and effect relationships. The methodology was not a scientific investigation based upon formulating explicit propositions, rigorously testing repeated observations, and supporting the findings of those observations with various quantitative and statistical techniques. Thus, we did not formulate or test any statistical model in this thesis.

The various communication media suggest conflicting views on the role of United States foreign policy in world politics. This is especially true in the Middle East. These conflicting views appear to represent identifiable theories, whether expressed or implied. These theories are based upon world events which are the source of changes in foreign policy, and these world events rarely occur independently of one another. Thus, the actions of one nation affect the actions of other nations. The response by those in positions of policy making to an there are observed cause and effect relationships by which foreign policy can be analyzed.

Accordingly, this thesis sought to explain how United States foreign policy is affected in the Middle East through cause and effect relationships. Each event has immediate connections to prior events, but in studying causes, we sought to identify explicit relationships and not coincidental events.

Sources for identifying and investigating coherent theories affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East were predominantly from United States Department of State literature, past and present government officials with extensive knowledge of United States foreign policy in the Middle East, recognized authorities possessing expertise in Middle Eastern affairs, and official Department of Defense literature dealing with the Middle East.

Consideration was given to sending questionnaires to experts in the field of Middle East foreign policy, but this idea was discarded for several reasons. First, characteristically poor participation from questionnaires may not have provided the data base necessary to make the comprehensive analysis needed for this research. Second, the type of questions required in a questionnaire for this research did not lend itself to selecting from a list of answers, but rather an essay-type response requiring considerably more time to complete. Third, experts in Middle East foreign policy have provided sufficient

information on their views in numerous publications. These publications are easily obtainable and sufficient in volume and were used for this research. Therefore, an extensive literature review was the method by which information was collected. Such a literature review provided both facts and opinions. Opinions range from unsubstantiated impressions to verified conclusions. Where opinions were used, this thesis was based upon verified conclusions made by acceptable authorities. In essence, this thesis sought a synthesis of past and present theory and in so doing refuted those strands of theory not supported by cause and effect relationships.

CHAPTER III

THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

Introduction

United States foreign policy in the Middle East focuses primarily on the Soviet threat, the international oil situation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict (120). The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for an understanding of United States foreign policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the root of the conflict is the re-creation of the Jewish state, Israel. The Jews believe that they have a God-given right to the land while the Palestinian Arabs believe that their 2,000 years of occupying Palestine has given them claim to the land. Since this issue of the right to the land is such a highly emotional issue with an important historical base, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the major historical events leading to the creation of Israel in 1948 and Israel's subsequent fight for national survival.

Edwin Wright, a former member of the State Department for Middle Eastern Affairs, said in a speech in February, 1979, that in order for one to understand the Middle East and the current conflict between Arabs and Jews, one must begin in the ancient times, as early as

3500 B.C. (120). An analysis of these events is essential in understanding the Jewish position. This chapter traces the struggle of the Jewish people from ancient times, to the creation of Israel, and through the tragic events of the last three decades in a manner that will demonstrate the effects that major events in history have played in creating the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Jewish Origins and Ancient Israel

The founder of the Jews was Abraham. Abraham journeyed from the land of Ur (present day Iraq) in Southern Mesopotamia through Syria and into the land of Canaan in obedience of the will of God (26:300; 96:7; 103:30). Abraham's followers were Bedouin tribesmen and the first of the Jewish people (55:1). Upon reaching Canaan, Abraham made a covenant with God in which God gave the land to Abraham and his descendants forever and annointed them the "Chosen People." In return, Abraham and his people were to follow only one God (26:300; 103:20; 108:40). Besides being the first event of the oldest monotheistic religion, this is the basic event that puts Jewish claim on the land of present day Israel. God gave the Jews the land. In this sense, the land is theirs forever, and one must never forget the importance of this event when dealing with Israel.

After a period in Canaan, the Jews under Jacob, the grandson of Abraham, migrated into Egypt (34:52;

96:7). History is not precise as to why the Jews went into Egypt; it is not evident whether they went as free men or slaves. They may have followed the Hyksos, a war-like Semitic people, for protection or as a result of famine (34:53-5; 96:7; 103:30). The Jews spent approximately 430 years in Egypt, and sometime during that period they were forced into bondage and served the Egyptians until Moses led them out of Egypt in approximately 1220 B.C. (34:52-53; 55:1; 103:30). Moses led the Jews through the wilderness for forty years in the goal of returning to the "Promised Land" of Canaan. This exodus was the consolidating event that gave the Jewish people their principles of unity of people and religion, rejection of all Gods but one, and the ancient claim to the "Promised Land" (4:36; 34:57; 103:30-31).

Initially, when the Jews returned to the "Promised Land" they did not form a sovereign state, but separated into twelve more or less independent tribes (26:303; 96:8). Eventually, Saul united these tribes into one kingdom, Judea (26:304-305; 96:8; 103:31). After Saul, David the Psalmist King, came to power, extended the borders of Judea, conquered Jerusalem, and made it his capital. In 961 B.C. Solomon, the son of David, became King, and Judea entered its zenith (26:304-305). It was during his reign that the first Jewish Temple was built in Jerusalem. This Temple gradually became the focal point

of religious and cultural life for the Jewish people (26:307; 96:8). The importance of this Temple to the Jews should not be underestimated. Will Durant in his study of civilization showed the importance of the Temple:

Next to the promulgation of the "Book of Law" the building of the Temple was the most important event in the epic of the Jews. The Temple gave Judea a spiritual center and capital, a vehicle of tradition, a memory to serve as a pillar of fire through centuries of wandering over the earth [26:308-309].

After Solomon's death, Judea was split into two kingdoms, Israel and Judah. This first Kingdom of Judea, which lasted less than 200 years, provided "the religious and emotional basis for Jewish interest in Palestine and Zionist claims to the area [55:1]."

Around 721 B.C., the Kingdom of Israel was conquered by the Assyrians, and many Jews were either expelled or deported. Somehow, Judah escaped Assyrian conquest, but in 585 B.C. Judah did fall to Nebuchadnezzar II of Babylon. Nebuchadnezzar II made both Israel and Judah Babylonian dependencies. He carried some 10,000 Jews off into bondage in Babylon and placed a puppet King, Zedekiah, over the Jews. Zedekiah, however, had visions of freedom from the Babylonians and rebelled. Nebuchadnezzar returned, squelched the rebellion, destroyed the Temple, burned Jerusalem to the ground, and forced practically all of the citizens of Jerusalem into captivity in Babylon (96:8; 103:31). Thus, the era of the First Temple ended, but in this era were the seeds of religious thought that

have united Jews for centuries and still exist today. The ideas of unity of people and religion, a desire to live in the "Promised Land" that was given to them by God, and the association of Jerusalem as their capital are concepts that still apply today. The remaining Jewish history is one of continued dispersion and attempts to reestablish the "Promised Land."

Roman Rule and The Diaspora

Roman rule of Judea began in approximately 63 B.C. During the Roman conquest, history says that 12,000 Jews were slaughtered, 30,000 pressed into slavery, and a nominal ruler was put into power. Judea became part of the Roman province of Syria in 63 B.C. (25:531; 55:2; 103:33). In approximately 64 A.D., the Jews rebelled (25:531-535; 96:9). It took Rome seven years to subdue the rebellion and after the revolt the Jews were pressed into slavery. The number of Jews killed has been estimated at 600,000 or more (25:537-545). The Roman commander, Titus, and his soldiers burned the Second Temple and conducted one of the most horrible slaughters in Jewish history "as Jews fought to the death or threw themselves into the flames of the burning temple [49:32]." This was the beginning of Diaspora, the mass dispersion of the Jews, for flight or enslavement were forced upon many. So many of these Jews fled that the destruction of the Second Temple is considered by most scholars as the start

of the Diaspora, although it began six centuries prior with the Babylonian captivity. This was just a renewal, but on a much larger scale (49:33; 55:2; 103:33).

Although the Jewish rebellion was crushed, their rebellious spirit remained. Rome tightened its repression of Jewish culture and religion. The Roman Emperor Hadrian resolved to destroy Judaism. In 130 A.D., Hadrian declared his intention to raise a shrine to Jupiter on the site of the old Temple. A year later, he issued a ban on circumcision and all public instruction in the Jewish law. What resulted was another Jewish rebellion in 132 A.D. (49:33; 96:9). This rebellion was led by Simeon Bar Cocheba, whom many believed to have been the Messiah, and was almost successful. The rebellion lasted three years and was brought to an end in 135 A.D. due to lack of food and supplies for the Jewish rebels. Nearly 580,000 men died, and nearly all of Judea was laid to waste. Judea then became Syria Palestine, and Jerusalem was renamed Aelia Capitolina. The Jews were forbidden to enter the city. Once a year, on the anniversary of the destruction of the Second Temple, Jews were allowed to return to the city to mourn their lost Temple. The mourning was done at a fragment of the Temple that still remained, and it became known as the "Wailing Wall" (49:33; 55:2; 96:9). This practice of praying at the "Wailing Wall" is still

done today, and is further evidence of the Jewish commitment to historical tradition.

The Jews never recovered from Bar Cocheba's defeat. Only a few thousand Jews remained in the "Promised Land," and Jewish history began to be the history of Jewish communities spread throughout the world. Even though the Jewish homeland was lost, it continued to direct Jewish thought and to keep the Jews united, for God had given the land to them and "it shall be returned" (25:549; 49:41-42; 96:10). By the end of the second century, Jewish life in the "Promised Land" was virtually extinct. With political sovereignty lost, it remained for Jewish religion, literature, and culture to keep them united (103:34).

Jewish Life in the Diaspora

The dispersed Jews fell into three categories. First, the Ashkenazic Jews were those who lived in Europe outside of Spain and under Christianity. Second, the Sephardic Jews were the Spanish Jews and all of the Jews within the Mediterranean basin that were intermingled. The third type of Jew was the Oriental Jew. These were the Jews who existed in various Middle Eastern communities from before the destruction of the Second Temple. The differences in geography of these three groups was outweighed by the enormous body of religious law, ritual, customs, lore, and knowledge that they shared. They also

shared a common conception of Jewish history and destiny. These ideas centered on the Galuth and Geullah which they commonly shared. The Galuth was their exile, and the Geullah their delivery from exile and return to the "Promised Land" which was their God-given destiny (96:2-3).

Overall, the Jews received better treatment from Islamic nations in Asia than they did from Christian nations in Europe (16; 55:3). The Jews suffered greatly at the hands of Christian Europe between 700 to 1400. European Jews, except for those in Islamic Spain, were concentrated in the towns and confined to special quarters known as ghettos. They were considered foreigners and foreign looking, keeping to themselves, and clinging to their religion. They held unpopular but needed jobs, and were viewed as bearing the guilt for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. For these reasons and more, the Jews became intensely disliked in Christian Europe. During the Crusades, it was considered as pious an act to kill European Jews as it was to kill the Saracens in the Holy Land. In England, France, and parts of Germany, the Jews were tortured, massacred, and finally expelled. The Jews in Islamic Spain fared well until the Spanish Inquisition when they either converted to Christianity, died, or left (49:67; 96:12). The Spanish Jews fled back into North Africa and the Islamic countries where their treatment was considerably better than under Christianity. The Western

European Jews fled eastward to Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary. Eventually half of the Jews in the world lived in these areas. Poland protected them, but Russia conquered the area. The Russians created the "pale of settlement" which was a territorial ghetto of Jews extending from the Baltic Sea north of Warsaw to the Black Sea near Odessa. The purpose of the "pale of settlement" was to keep the Jews from penetrating Holy Russia (49:69; 96:12).

Some Jews found refuge in the New World. The first Jewish settlers to come to the Americas were from Spain and Portugal and came as a result of the Spanish Inquisition. The first Jews came to what is now the United States in 1654 and settled in New Amsterdam which eventually became New York City (49:65). In the nineteenth century, the United States opened its doors to the Jews and hundreds of thousands came. They were fleeing the conditions of Europe and the open door policy of the United States gave them the opportunity. The United States needed immigration at this time to help in its westward expansion. Jewish communities sprang up from coast to coast throughout the United States. In the United States, the Jews found a haven of freedom that they had never experienced in all of their dispersion (49:65-78). Paralleling the nineteenth century Jewish immigration to the United States was a move in another direction.

This was Zionism, and the object of the movement was a Jewish state in the "Promised Land" (49:81).

Modern Zionism

In the early nineteenth century, the stimulus of general European Nationalism began to awaken the Jewish traditional yearning for their "Promised Land" and gave it a nationalistic twist. A major stimulus was the French Revolution which helped the Jews gain basic rights formerly denied them. Napoleon, in March, 1799 called upon Jews to rally under their flag and restore the Jerusalem of old (7:13; 49:75; 96:15). Early Jewish leaders advocating a return to the "Promised Land" were Rabbis Judah Bibas, Judah Alcalay, Zri Hirsch Kalisher, and Joseph Natonek. Although these men represented minority opinions, their ideas were gaining support (96:15). In France, in 1853, Joseph Salvador advocated a Jewish state founded on the shores of Galilee in ancient Canaan (7:14). Other proponents of a Jewish homeland in the original "Promised Land" were Moses Hess in his 1862 book, Rome and Jerusalem, Peretz Smolenskin's 1873 argument for a return without waiting for the Messiah, and Leo Pinsker's 1882 pamphlet, Auto-Emancipation: A Warning of a Russian Jew to His Brethren. Pinsker's pamphlet marked the beginning of Russian Zionism, although the term Zionism was not coined until 1886 by an Austrian journalist Nathan Birnbaum (7:14; 96:17; 103:36).

The Zionist movement succeeded because it combined the return to the "Promised Land" with what appeared to be the Jewish problem of the nineteenth century. That problem was the result of the enlightenment and emancipation of European Jews by the French Revolution. The Revolution upset the doctrinal and social order which had stood for centuries as Jews were offered freedom and equality with non-Jewish Europe. This occurred provided the Jews ceased to regard themselves as a separate nationality and assimilate themselves into their national culture while retaining only their religion. This movement eventually became known as Reform Judaism (96:16). Pinsker's contribution lay in the fact that he provided religious and nationalistic yearnings for the "Promised Land." He supported his argument by attacking the process of assimilation as an illusion. He said that anti-Jewish behavior was an inescapable passion in Gentiles. This Gentile behavior was caused by the character the Jewish people had as an abnormal nation. Emancipation was not the cure for this attitude. The only logical solution was for the Jews to establish a state of their own and make it an equal nation among nations (96:17).

By the 1860s, most European nations had emancipated their Jews. Only Tsarist Russia and Rumania failed to do so. This was a major factor in that Russia contained the largest group of European Jews and Rumania

the second largest group. For this reason, the Zionist cause was greatest in these areas. With the assassination of the Russian Tsar in 1881, a period of repression and pogroms was carried out against the Jews. This started the most massive wave of migration in Jewish history and created the Lovers of Zion in Russia in 1882 from which sprang the first agricultural colonization movement back to the "Promised Land" (49:102; 96:16-17).

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Zionist movement was led by Theodor Herzl. Herzl believed that anti-Semitism was ineradicable. In 1892, he wrote an article entitled "French Anti-Semites" in which he voiced his concern for the problem. After the Dreyfus case in France, he published an essay, The Jewish State, in which he called for a separate Jewish nation (7:15; 96:18-20; 103:36-37). Some Jews thought Herzl was chosen by God to lead the Zionist movement, for it was not so much the contents of Herzl's essay that set him apart from others as it was his personality (49:81-110). Some Jews even believed that Herzl was the Messiah (49:110).

Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland in August, 1897. Jews from seventeen different countries, including the United States, attended. The Congress adopted Herzl's aim of establishing a Jewish state and founded the World Zionist Organization to

advance the cause of Zionism (96:20). At the end of the Congress, Herzl wrote in his diary:

In Basle I found the Jewish State. If I were to say this aloud I would meet with general laughter; but in another five years, and certainly in another fifty years, everyone will be convinced of this. The state is created mainly upon the people's will for a state [Quoted in 96:20].

Herzl did not receive unanimous support for Zionism. The orthodox Jews were against Zionism. They believed that the Messiah should come to lead the Jews back into the "Promised Land," and were against a man-made migration. Some Jews looked upon Zionism as a way to lose freedoms and their ability to be individuals, and others thought Herzl to be an impractical dreamer (49:111; 55:4). In fact, the World Zionist Organization contained only a minority of Jews as its members. In 1899, out of a world population of about fourteen million Jews, only 114,000 were Zionists, and fourteen years later at the start of World War I only 130,000 members could be counted (96:21).

Herzl was flexible in his location for the Jewish state and would accept territory other than Palestine. The British provided a test for the land sought by the Zionists. In 1903, they offered the Zionists territory in Eastern Africa for Jewish settlement. Herzl and other Zionists were willing to accept the offer, but in 1905, a year after Herzl's death, the 7th Zionist Congress defeated the proposal and dedicated itself to a Jewish state in Palestine (49:112-113; 55:4; 96:20).

World War I and the Balfour Declaration

As World War I approached, the Zionist sought political help for their cause. France would have little to do with the Zionists because most Jews were from Central Europe, and the French suspected Jewish nationalism as the advance guard of German influence. Even though most Jewish immigrants into Palestine during the nineteenth and early twentieth century were from Russia, the Zionists received little support there (68:6; 95:195-196). This left Britain and the Germans from which to seek support, and the Zionists attempted to gain help from each (7:18; 68:6). Chaim Weizmann, a British chemist, and Nahum Sokolow, a Russian, headed the efforts in Britain to achieve Zionist goals in Palestine (55:4).

At the start of World War I, only 85,000 Jews were living in Palestine (7:17; 95:192). What the Zionists needed was a major power to back their nationalistic goals and immigration into Palestine. They found that power in Britain who, at that time, was engaged in a war with the Ottoman Empire, the ruler of Palestine. The Zionists gained a foothold in Britain through their public propaganda campaign for Zionism, and in their gaining political support from several government officials including Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary (7:19; 95:217-218). Lord Balfour agreed to propose a resolution to the British cabinet in support of Zionism, and Weizmann helped to

draft it. The resolution met opposition from Sir Edwin Montagu, the only Jew in the cabinet and Secretary of State for India. The final resolution wording was weakened and then passed. Weizmann blamed the opposition of Montagu for the substantial weakening of the final draft (55:6; 95:210-212). This draft appeared as the Balfour Declaration and was set in a personal letter from Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild, the leader of the British Zionists on November 2, 1917 (55:13; 68:214). The Balfour Declaration read:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspiration which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation [68:27].

The Balfour Declaration was not just a humanitarian consideration in support of Zionism, but served British political needs and long-range strategic interests (96:26).

Britain had four objectives behind the Balfour Declaration other than just humanitarian support for the Zionists. First, it was designed to help Russia stay in the war. Russia was in revolution, and the Jews played a

part in it. Britain hoped to give the Russian Jews an incentive to exert their influence against Russia's pulling out of World War I. Second, it was designed to counter the apathy of the United States' Jewish population toward the war caused by discrimination against Jews within Tsarist Russia, a British ally. Third, Britain expected to reap propaganda benefits in all countries that had sufficient Jewish populations. Fourth, it was designed to beat the Germans in gaining Jewish support, for the German Zionists were pressing Germany for support of their cause. A long-range goal was that a Jewish homeland allied to Britain in the Middle East would help Britain counter French influence in that area (55:5; 68:6; 96:25).

At the same time that the Balfour Declaration was being constructed, the British were bringing the Arabs into their camp. Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner of Egypt, was negotiating with Sharif Hussein of the Hejza for Arab support and help in throwing the Turks out of the Middle East. The Arabs were experiencing a wave of nationalism, and Britain induced the Arabs by offering them independence after the war. McMahon promised them all of the land in the area except for some which was not strictly Arab. After the war, a debate ensued as to whether Palestine was exempted as part of this arrangement (55:7-8; 95:127-128, 219).

The British did not, at this time, see a conflict in what they were doing. The Balfour Declaration spoke only of a Jewish homeland and not of a Jewish state. It also protected non-Jewish rights in the area of the Jewish homeland (68:6; 103:40). The Zionists and Arabs, however, each viewed British action as eventually giving them sovereign control over Palestine. This conflict in policy by the British would lead to their eventual downfall and withdrawal from the Middle East.

The British were by no means alone in their support of the Zionists. The United States supported, at least verbally, the Balfour Declaration (68:6). American Jewry was active in World War I in support of the European Jews because of Jewish oppression within Russia. Under the chairmanship of Louis Brandeis, the first Jew to serve on the United States Supreme Court, a Provisional Committee was formed to raise relief funds (49:121). After the Balfour Declaration in 1917, Louis Brandeis urged President Wilson to announce support for the Declaration. Over objections by United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing, President Wilson declared his support for the Balfour Declaration (68:6; 95:212-213).

Although the United States never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, United States entry into World War I resulted in the first United States Middle East foreign policy. This was because President Wilson had a powerful

influence upon final Middle East peace settlements through his alliance with Great Britain (68:6). Wilson's fourteen points impacted the Middle East situation. His first point was the repudiation of secret agreements among nations. Such an agreement, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, had been formed splitting the power influence within the Middle East between Britain and France. Wilson's repudiation of this agreement aided United States goodwill within the Middle East. His fifth point was that the interests of the local populations must be equally considered with nations having territorial claims over the land. Wilson made an even greater impact upon the Middle East when his twelfth point asserted that the rights of the non-Turkish areas of the Ottoman Empire be free from both Turkish and colonial rule. This played into Arab nationalistic claims and brought the United States into a favorable light within the Arab world (68:5-6).

It seems hard to believe that during this time period neither Britain nor the Zionists considered the Arabs, who had lived in Palestine for almost 2,000 years, as a factor opposing the Jewish settlement of Palestine. They both seem to have underestimated the Arab role. This may have been due to the illiteracy of the Arabs which resulted in the belief that the Arabs could not be a political factor (95:218). The Arabs, at this time, were not overly concerned with Zionism. From 1918 to 1919, Amir

Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein, was more concerned about French aspirations in the Middle East than he was about Zionism. This was probably due to the fact that relatively few Jews actually lived in Palestine and that the Jewish immigration rate was low (55:12). Faisal met with Weizmann and on January 3, 1919, signed an agreement welcoming Jewish immigration to Palestine. Faisal, however, specifically made the agreement dependent upon the fulfillment of the wartime pledges of the British regarding Arab independence. The Arabs supported their part of the agreement. On March 3, 1919, Faisal wrote a letter referring to the Arabs and Jews as cousins and declaring that there was enough room for both in Syria. He also made it explicitly clear that the Arabs would not accept a Jewish state but only a possible Jewish province within a larger Arab state (55:12; 103:40). In the previous year, on March 23, 1918, an article in Hussein's official publication, Al Qibla, "called upon the Palestine Arabs to welcome Jews as Brethren and to cooperate with them for the common welfare [55:9]." This was in response to Weizmann's assurance in 1918 that the Jews only wanted a homeland and not a political state. When Britain failed to fulfill her promises to the Arabs, the Arabs contended the Faisal-Weizmann treaty to be void (55:9-12; 103:40). The Arabs had a clue as to what was going to happen in Palestine when in 1919 Lord Balfour said: "For in

Palestine we do not propose even to go through the forum of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country [55:13]."

In 1919, the United States sent the King-Crane Commission into the Middle East to determine the wishes of the local people as to their political development. Their analysis recommended that unlimited immigration of Jews into Palestine be stopped and that a Jewish state not be created (68:6-7; 103:40). The Commission stated that they began their investigation in favor of Zionism, but had to change their attitude after viewing the facts. Their findings were:

We recommend serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish state. The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not likely to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. For the initial claim often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine based on occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered [68:32-33].

Although the King-Crane Commission made its report in 1919, it was not made public until 1922, after the Paris Peace Conference granted the British Mandate for Palestine (55:13).

The British Mandate

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 made Great Britain the Mandatory Power for Palestine. Initially, the

Balfour Declaration was only a loosely worded promise in a personal letter to Lord Rothschild. However, the Palestine Mandate Agreement between Britain and the League of Nations had the Balfour Declaration incorporated in it. This was the Zionists' first internationally binding pledge of support, and it strengthened their political claims to Palestine (55:6; 103:40-41). Apparently, both Britain and the League of Nations must have felt that building a Jewish home in Palestine and the protection of Arab rights were not incompatible objectives. They believed that the entire population of Palestine would benefit from the material prosperity which Jewish immigration and money would bring into the country. They felt that the Arabs would ultimately accept the situation (55:17). The United States also supported this position. The 67th Congress of the United States passed a joint resolution supporting the Jewish national home in September, 1922.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled.

That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected [68:40].

The belief that both the Arabs and Jews could be appeased was incorrect. Riots broke out between the two factions in 1920 and in 1921 (7:23; 96:28).

United States foreign policy toward the Middle East, at this time, was concerned primarily with the exploration of oil. The thrust of United States involvement was the assurance that the mandated territories would be open to American oil companies, as well as to companies of Mandate holders. The United States was trying to stay out of complicated alliances within the area, and consequently, the Jewish settlement of Palestine was rather a minor issue (33:735-737; 68:7,39; 109:240-241).

During the 1920s, there were three sides to the Arab-Zionist dispute. The Arabs believed that they were within their rights in claiming Palestine as their home, and therefore, they were entitled to political control of Palestine. They resented the Jews as an alien people within Arab land. They also felt that the Jews were eventually going to gain political control of the land. The Jew felt that Palestine was his homeland. After all, God had given it to him. Because of Jewish persecution for almost 2,000 years, the Jew felt justified in his demand to be allowed to return to his own land. The Jews also felt that the international community had agreed with their right to Palestine. They had the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate to support them. They countered the Arab position with the following argument:

This position of course overlooks the fact that the Palestine Arabs for many centuries had been under Turkish rule and control. They had not fought to free themselves from this rule but England had driven the

Turks out and from the standpoint of conquered territory it was hers (England's) to do with it what she wished [49:144].

The British felt that their duty was to ensure that the rights of the Arab inhabitants should not be violated, and having assured Arabs rights, they would protect the rights of all others, Jews included (49:144-145). All three sides thought that their views were justified and continual conflict followed.

The Zionist cause was never a majority cause among the Jews. During the 1920s, Jewish immigration into Palestine was light. In fact, in 1927, 2,000 Jews arrived in Palestine and 5,000 left. Jewish arrivals under the Mandate only totaled 14,338 people for the years of 1929, 1930, and 1931 combined. What gave the acceleration to the Zionist cause was the rise of Hitler to power in Central and Eastern Europe. His oppression of the European Jews forced a mass migration. Restrictive immigration policies in the United States and other Western countries forced most Jewish refugees to seek refuge in Palestine. Although moved by the persecution of the European Jews, these Christian nations were unwilling to accept the refugees fleeing Nazi tyranny. Consequently, these nations pushed for large-scale immigration into Palestine. Jewish immigration in 1932 was double that of 1921 and increasing. In 1935, 61,859 Jews immigrated into Palestine, and by 1939, 450,000 Jews were in Palestine for 30 percent of

the population. If it had not been for Hitler's total persecution of the Jews, it is doubtful that Arab-Zionist problems would have occurred so fast and so violently (7:24-32; 55:18-24; 96:5-27). Valdimir Jabotinsky, a devote Zionist, defined the Jewish position in 1937:

What I do not deny is that in that process the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine. What I do deny is that that is a hardship. It is quite understandable that the Arabs of Palestine would also prefer Palestine to be the Arab state No. 4, No. 5, or No. 6--that I quite understand; but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation [Quoted in 55:38].

The Arabs, however, did not see the Jewish problem in the same light. All they saw was that their land was being bought by the Jews. Once this land was bought, it became the inalienable property of the Jewish people. Arabs were not allowed to repurchase the land, nor could an Arab be allowed to work on the land (55:18). Jewish industry frowned upon the employment of Arabs. The Arab felt that he was being pushed out of his own country (55:18).

In 1929, an Arab riot broke out in Palestine over an incident at the "Wailing Wall." Whole Arab villages turned on their Jewish neighbors, and there was wholesale looting, burning, and killing. The Jews blamed the British government for many of the murdered Jews (7:3-8; 96:29). The result of the riot was the Hope-Simpson Royal Commission which found that the Arab unrest stemmed from three factors: (1) Jewish immigration and land purchases,

(2) the economy and political situation becoming dominated by the Jews, and (3) the feeling that the Arabs were not fairly represented in London on matters concerning their welfare (55:22).

Again, in 1936, riots broke out within Palestine (7:43). The British Peel Commission was assigned to look into the situation. It found that the promises made to both the Arabs and Jews were irreconcilable and that the Mandate was unworkable. This was the first official report ever correctly analyzing the Palestine problem. The recommended solution was to partition the country into a Jewish state and an Arab state (55:25; 103:44). In 1937, the Zionist Congress agreed to accept partition in principle, but only if the Jewish area was sufficiently large enough for their needs. The Arabs rejected any partition (55:25; 103:44). The Woodhead Commission was given the task of drawing up the partition. In the end, the Commission found the partition to be impractical, and the partition idea was dropped (55:26; 103:44).

The Jewish and Arab positions had become entrenched. The Jewish position was expertly summed up by William Hull:

But we do not wish to digress nor stray from our basic thesis. The return of Israel to their homeland was still based upon the promise of God and through His divine intervention. The Arab, from a natural standpoint, had a right to feel the justice of his claims and position. Probably the Canaanite felt just as strongly in the days of Joshua. The Britisher, from a natural standpoint, was but manifesting

Christian compassion for the Arabs and a British sense of fair play. But God-before Him all opposition must melt away. His will must supersede all the ideas and plans of mankind. He is the Creator, we are the created. He is the Potter, we are but the clay which it is His perfect right to mold as he sees fit. Looked upon in this light, the Palestine problem reveals man in opposition to God's will. The historic facts of the last thirty-odd years prove our thesis to be correct, for every effort of man to hinder this move of God was checked. The State of Israel was the clay come forth from the Potter's hand. We realize that the State is still imperfect, for it was marred in the hand of the Potter, and it will once more have to be broken in the Potter's hand and made anew. Nevertheless even the marred vessel is the work of God [49:145].

One must always remember this basic Jewish conviction when dealing with Israel. The Arab position has continued to profess that the land is theirs. They lived on it for almost 2,000 years and have now been displaced by aliens. They feel that justice is on their side. The situation is deadlocked between a people supported by God and a people supported by justice. Neither side can be a winner. What has been learned from this period is that:

The conflicting pledges and indecision of the British to achieve their goals in complete disregard for the feelings and interests of the Palestine Arabs, and the political immaturity of the Arabs themselves at this critical stage in the history of Palestine helped to launch the chain of events which produced the Arab-Israeli dilemma confronting the world today [55:15].

The British answer to the Palestine problem for the next decade was a British White Paper (103:45).

The British White Paper of 1939 limited Jewish immigration and the purchase of land in Palestine. The paper further projected a Palestinian government at the

end of a ten-year period subject to Jewish-Arab agreement. Acceptance of the White Paper on behalf of the Arabs was divided. The Palestinian Arab Higher Committee rejected the Paper. Likewise, the Jewish Agency* also rejected it, citing the plan as directly conflicting with the Balfour and Mandate obligations (103:45). Furthermore, the White Paper was vehemently and eloquently opposed by Churchill himself (109:83). In effect, the White Paper was a British attempt to effect Arab support for the Palestine issue. The reversal of apparent pro-Jewish support of the Balfour Declaration through the issuance of the White Paper only succeeded in compounding the problem of declining British influence in Palestine. To the rest of the world, Britain maintained the image of a peacemaker who was attempting to enhance the public good (109:220).

World War II and Growing United States Involvement

Despite Jewish resentment to the British White Paper, at the outbreak of World War II Jewish volunteers joined the British army in fighting the Axis Powers in North Africa (65:281). Arab volunteers from Palestine also served with the British and made important

*The Jewish Agency, representing the World Zionist Organization, worked in close cooperation with the government. Its aims were to promote developing Israel through unifying Jewish people, encouraging immigration, organizing Jewish immigration, and in welcoming and assisting immigrants in social and economic integration (103:440).

contributions to the Allied cause in Iraq and Syria (103:45). It was World War II that brought the United States into a more active role in the Middle East (64:671). Until the First World War, United States interest had been mostly cultural. The United States' position was noncommittal as evidenced by its lack of foreign policy in the Middle East. In the interwar period, American oil companies in search of fortunes marked the degree of involvement by the United States (9:29-31). But now World War II resulted in America supplying manpower to Iran and arms and material to Egypt. During the war, President Roosevelt extended lend-lease assistance to both Turkey and Iran. Roosevelt described our assistance to Turkey as vital to the defense of the United States. On March 6, 1944, President Roosevelt stated that the United States had vital interests in the Middle East and the peace and security of the Middle East was significantly important to the entire world (47:120). In Defense of the Middle East, John Campbell described the United States role:

President Roosevelt generally went along with Mr. Churchill's idea that Britain should "play the hand" in the Middle East just as the United States played it in the Pacific, but this did not mean disinterest in the future of the region. The President indeed had a very lively interest in the future of the Arab world which he demonstrated by his visit with King Ibn Saud in Egyptian waters in February 1945 on his way back from Yalta [9:31].

But also during the war the Zionists, under David Ben-Gurion, began eliciting support of American Jews. In 1942, in a meeting at a New York hotel, the Biltmore Program was adopted. This program was noted for two major themes. First, it called for the complete relaxation of Jewish immigration into Palestine by permitting unlimited immigration. Second, a significant change in the term "homeland," used in earlier British declarations, was included. The word "commonwealth" was substituted. Thus, the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth came into existence (103:45). Holding this important meeting on United States soil had tremendous psychological implications. For the first time it brought the Jewish position directly to the forefront of the American people.

The hideous persecution of Jews in Nazi concentration camps added further impetus to the Jewish position of unlimited immigration. The Irgun and Stern groups, extremist underground Jewish organizations, increased pressures on British forces in Palestine when news of the persecutions reached Palestine (103:45-46). The inhumanity of the Jewish plight intensified feelings of support within the United States. By the end of World War II American policy "reflected a strong humanitarian feeling that a haven in Palestine must be opened to the remnants of persecuted European Jewry [103:35]." After a majority of Senate and House of Representatives members

presented a letter to President Truman on July 2, 1945, requesting the President to use his influence with the British government in opening Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration, President Truman proceeded with their request. It is interesting to note that this letter also urged the establishment of a "free democratic Jewish Commonwealth" in Palestine (49:235; 65:281).

But the effects of World War II led to increased United States involvement for another reason. Drains on domestic petroleum reserves from the war caused Middle East oil to become an urgent concern of United States policy. America recognized the need to insure that sufficient future oil supplies would be available to meet acute shortages (109:240).

Although the United States found herself more and more involved in Middle East affairs, she failed to develop an overall, long-range policy for the area. Improvisations of policies were designed in meeting pressing needs of the hour. Contradictory promises of President Roosevelt and President Truman echoed British actions of earlier years. In The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, Khouri stated that "these divergent promises not only led to one policy dilemma after another, but they added seriously to the complications surrounding the Palestine problem [55:39]." Campbell, in Defense of the Middle East, supported the idea of the weakness of American

policy in Israel because "it was tied to no broad concept of national interest," and was, therefore, inconsistent and ineffective (9:37).

At the end of the war, Britain's Labor Party came to power. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, directed the return to the White Paper edicts. In November, 1945, the Anglo-American Committee was formed. This was a result of British efforts to rally United States support for Britain's Palestine policy. Great Britain sought to have the United States share the responsibility and examine the problem of European Jew immigration into Palestine. Jewish resistance increased. Both Arabs and Jews formed reprisals against the Mandate authorities. The rise of Arab nationalism, speeded up by the war, was coming to fruition (9:17). In 1945 an Arab League was formed. Arab initiatives concentrated on eliminating the Mandate, driving the British power from the area, and then defeating the Jewish Agency (103:46). By 1946, terrorism and resistance increased against Mandate authorities. By early 1947 Bevin encouraged his government to turn over the Palestinian problem to the United Nations. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed. This committee recommended partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, special international status for Jerusalem, and economic support joining the three together. The recommended U.N.

Partition Plan of 1947 is depicted in Figure 1. Both the United States and the Soviet Union supported the plan. After intensive debate, the plan was adopted as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. Israel's Proclamation of Independence followed on May 14, 1948 (103:46-47).

As the Arab-Jewish issue gained momentum, the United States was simultaneously faced with another issue in the Middle East. France lost her mandates over Syria and Lebanon in 1945 and the influence of Great Britain began to decline as she gave up Palestine in 1948. The balance of power was now open to two new world leaders, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets pressured Turkey, Greece, and Iran in the post-war years. Stalin demanded that Turkey cede two northern provinces and sought the right to garrison the Turkish Straits. Stalin also demanded the right to Iranian oil concessions and plotted to install a puppet government in Azerbaijan, Iran (57:10). With Great Britain drained of resources and in a weakened position as a result of the war, the United States intervened. After public debate and Congressional action, the decision of the United States to assume responsibility for Turkey, Greece, and Iran marked a major milestone in American foreign policy. This milestone, as part of the Truman Doctrine, was to eventually lead to the formation and




Fig. 1. U.N. Partition Plan: Territories
After 1948-49 (18:74)

expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the formation of the Central Treaty Organization (formerly the Baghdad Pact), and bilateral agreements between the United States and Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. What the Truman Doctrine did was put the United States in the traditional British role of halting Soviet expansion into the Middle East (68:61; 110:5). The Doctrine aroused the American people and Congress to stand firm against the Soviet threat of expansion and aggression. On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered his address to Congress.

I believe that it must be the foreign policy of the United States to support the free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own problems their own way . . . The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation [68:66-67].

No political or military commitments were immediately involved with Greece and Turkey with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. Assistance in the amount of 400 million dollars was requested by President Truman and Congress responded with a contribution of more than 600 million dollars to be used over a three year period (47:122;78). Thus, with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, enthusiastic and expeditious support by the Congress, and the interest of the American people, the United States assumed a major leadership role in the Middle East. America's stand against the Soviet threat of

the post-war period was to set the stage for United States involvement in world affairs from this point on.

The Formation of Israel and the Ensuing Conflict

In the Middle East, the formation of the state of Israel in May, 1948, led to increasing Arab-Israeli turmoil. A portion of the triggering mechanism behind Arab dissention was the mass immigration of Jews into Israel in the post-war years. Figure 2 depicts Jewish immigration into Israel from 1948 to 1966. Arabs feared that uncontrolled immigration would drive them from the land. Restrictive immigration laws of the United States and European nations only compounded the problem of immigration into Palestine. For example, less stringent United States immigration laws in the late 1800s provided a refuge in America for thousands of immigrants; however, by the 1920s legislation was passed that restricted immigration (17:10-19;24:97-98). This same legislation, still in effect after World War II, forced Jewish refugees to seek a homeland elsewhere.

As the conflict mounted in Palestine, Arab support came from Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. But the lack of experience, training and organization proved to be insufficient to counter Israeli forces. Private contributions from the United States were a significant factor in helping finance the 1948 to 1949 war




Fig. 2. Immigration to Israel (103:51)

(103:49). By January, 1949, Israel had gained and held territory that was to define its borders from this date until June of 1967. These borders were in excess of the planned limits considered in the United Nations resolution (103:47-48). Referring back to Figure 1 on page 53, the Israeli occupied territory after the 1948 to 1949 war can be compared to the 1947 U.N. Partition Plan. The new borders defining Israeli territory after the war created a serious Arab refugee problem. It was believed that more than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs who had lived in the territories became refugees (18:74). The 1948 to 1949 war and other wars that were to follow in the Arab-Israeli conflict caused significant Palestinian refugee problems.

During the conflict the United Nations worked actively in seeking an armistice agreement. Ralph Bunch, an American, was Acting Mediator of the United Nations Truce Commission. Through dedicated initiative, agreements were signed with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria from January through July of 1949. Iraq did not sign an agreement but withdrew its forces after relinquishing its positions to Transjordanian units.

The increasing Arab-Israeli conflict led to the formation of the Tripartite Declaration on May 25, 1950. Supported by France, Great Britain, and the United States, this declaration was established in the interest of avoiding an arms race in the Middle East. The three

nations also recognized the need for allowing both Israel and the Arab states to maintain the necessary forces to insure their internal security, self-defense, and regional defense. France, Great Britain, and the United States emphasized:

. . . their deep interest in and desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations [47:123].

To the United States, the Tripartite Declaration was not a direct commitment to support either Israel or the Arab states, but rather an overall policy of peace and security for the area. Violation of the declaration came in 1954 through a secret arms agreement between France and Israel. The Suez conflict of 1956 most likely made the declaration invalid for both Britain and France (47:123; 18:92).

In October-November 1956, the Suez crisis increased American concern in the Middle East. Soviet arms shipments to Egypt in 1955 and 1956 resulted in Israel preparing for war. Extensive Soviet military and economic aid to several other Arab states helped secure an influence the Soviet Union had never previously held in the Middle East (103:53). When Israel requested arms from the United States, President Eisenhower rejected the request, fearing an Arab-Israeli arms race.

Nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser in July, 1956 and his refusal to guarantee safety for Israeli ships further heightened Israeli fears. Britain, who operated the Canal, and France, whose private investors had considerable interest in the Canal, were heavily dependent on the Canal as a primary waterway for their Persian Gulf oil. Nasser's control could mean prohibiting canal use at any time. Consequently, Britain and France halted Egyptian assets available and began discussing possible combined military action. On October 29, 1956, Israel, fearful of a shifting balance of power in Egypt's favor, attacked. Britain and France followed suit several days later and within a week secured control of the Canal. United States pressure in the United Nations and on the three aggressors brought the conflict to a quick halt. Britain and France withdrew unconditionally but Israel still held Egyptian territory at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip (69:180). Although the United States had helped bring the conflict to a quick halt, a closer look at the solution revealed some unpleasant results.

The U.S. condemnation of the invasion helped save Nasser from a disastrous defeat. The outcome of the conflict was a severe political and moral setback for Britain and France in the Middle East from which Nasser and the Soviet Union reaped the major benefits. The Suez crisis led to a major "power vacuum" in the Middle East, making the area prone to renewed Soviet penetration [18:86].

Fearing the Middle East vacuum would be filled by the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower enunciated the

Eisenhower Doctrine in January, 1957. By March, a Joint Congressional Resolution was passed which included several major features. First, the President could cooperate with any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in developing economic strength for the preservation of national independence. Second, the President could provide military assistance programs to such nations. Third, when in harmony with its treaties and with the Constitution, the United States could use its armed forces to counter international communism upon request by any nation or group of nations (47:124; 68:93-94). The lack of precise geographical lines or specific list of nations in the resolution restricted the ability to act in carrying out the aims of the resolution (68:86).

In 1957, turmoil erupted in Syria and Lebanon. Internal turmoil in Iraq also occurred and in 1958 a coup took place in which the pro-American government of Iraq was overthrown. The new regime identified itself as "part of the Arab nation," closely aligned with the UAR. A tremendous rise in communist activity also took place late in the year (64:302). As a result of the coup, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. This move convinced Eisenhower and his Administration that a strong renewal of the United States' commitment to resist communism to the remaining Pact members was necessary. The Baghdad Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization and agreements with

Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran sealed the United States efforts to resist communism in the Middle East (18:86). This theme, resisting communism and supporting territorial integrity and political independence, was to prevail through the 1960s. It was in a news conference on November 14, 1963, that President Kennedy conveyed the United States' view of the Middle East.

We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy the independence of the people [68:185].

From 1960-1968 the mutual interests between the United States and Israel were most pronounced (103:216). Expressions of peace and security for the Middle East region were reiterated by both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. In 1964, the formation of the Unified Arab Command in Cairo was an attempt to coordinate Arab military resources. Perpetual tension in the Middle East continued to mount and Arab guerrilla activity within Palestine intensified.

The 1967 Six Day War Through the 1973 Yom Kippur War

Initially, Syria and Jordan provided the push for the guerrilla activity, and by May, 1967, Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula began. The United Nations Emergency Force was withdrawn from the Sinai upon demand by Nasser. A blockade of Israel's ships at the

entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba by Egypt caused Israel to declare such action to be a step toward war. When informed by Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aban Eban, that Israel would defend itself, the United States pursued diplomatic means to halt the impending crisis. In June, 1967, the Israeli-initiated, but Arab caused, Six Day War began. Israel launched a massive air assault, crippling Arab air power. Israeli ground forces successfully captured all of the Sinai to the East Bank of the Suez Canal, Jordan's West Bank, including all of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights of Syria. Figure 3 depicts the conquered territory occupied by Israel after the 1967 war. A United Nations cease-fire halted the turmoil. For Israel, the additional land acquired enhanced her military position and instilled tremendous morale and confidence in the Israelis (103:53-54). The 1967 war also ended any chance of improved relations with the Soviet Union that Israel had hoped to restore. The Suez crisis had strained the opportunity for immediate restored friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but the Six Day War pushed the Soviets to the Arab side. The new territories that Israel found itself occupying introduced a new set of circumstances in the Middle East. Israel chose to form peace treaties with the Arabs through direct negotiations, and refused to withdraw from occupied lands before a negotiated peace was drawn. The idea of major




Fig. 3. Middle East After 1967 War (18:75)

powers imposing a settlement was also rejected. Thus, the Six Day War did not provide a solution to old problems in the Middle East. Old problems continued to exist, perhaps intensify, and new problems emerged.

In June, 1967, President Johnson addressed a foreign policy conference hosted by the State Department in which he outlined five principles reiterating United States commitment in the Middle East.

Our country is committed--and we here reiterate that commitment today--to a peace [in the Middle East] that is based on five principles: first, the recognized right of national life; second, justice for the refugees; third, innocent maritime passage; fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all [Quoted in 18:81-84].

The philosophy of such eloquent principles was praiseworthy indeed, but a paradox remained in that territorial integrity for all was untenable after the 1967 war. Until the territorial issue was resolved by both Arabs and Jews, territorial integrity for all was not achievable.

Furthermore, with the Soviets supplying military assistance to the Arabs, the United States assumed the role as chief armament supplier to Israel when France terminated its arms supplies in 1967.

Again, the United Nations entered the scene and on November 22, 1967 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East was approved. A text of Resolution 242 is included in Appendix A. This resolution has been the basis for peace initiatives since

its inception. The major points of the plan called for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab regions; termination of belligerency between Arab nations and Israel; respect for and acknowledgement of "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" of every nation in the area; establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries;" an assurance of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; and a just settlement of the refugee problem. The Arabs have modified their demands for the return of specified lands in the 1947 U.N. partition plan since the 1967 Six Day War. They have been willing to accept the principles of Resolution 242 and want to return to the pre-1967 borders. These demands resulted in U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 (18:76; 46:191). Appendix A includes a copy of Resolution 338.

Despite the cease fire and U.N. Resolutions, guerilla raids and terrorist activity continued. President Nixon attempted new approaches by bringing three other major powers--Britain, France, and the Soviet Union--to talks with hopes of implementing the principles of the Security Council peace plan of November 22. This move was critically received by Israel who feared that a forced solution would be inequitable to herself. President Nixon rejected the assertion that the talks were aimed at imposing a solution. Jordan and the UAR led many Arab nations to accept the idea of four-power talks but other

forces, notably the guerrilla organizations of Palestine, objected vehemently (68:191-192).

In the fall of 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers stated that there is "no area of the world today that is more important, because it could easily again be the source of another conflagration [47:129]." American policy was aimed at urging the Arabs to accept permanent peace and encouraging the Israelis to relinquish occupied territory when their territorial integrity was guaranteed. The new Arab refugee problem created by the Six Day War further complicated the issue. By January, 1970, Israel was conducting bombing raids on Egyptian territory. The Soviets responded by saying they would be "forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be made [47:131]." The United States, having initially chosen to limit an arms buildup, once again emphasized her desire to avoid an arms race. Despite her efforts, America was forced into a position of increasing armaments to Israel. Nixon emphasized that when the balance of power put Israel in a weaker position, war would result. Thus, maintaining the balance of power was in America's interest. The problem was that "balance" seemed more to indicate Israel maintaining her superiority. At this point it was doubtful that any Arab interest

existed at all in American foreign policy in the Middle East.

By late 1971 and early 1972, the United States recognized the need to deal individually and directly with Egypt and Israel. The American role shifted to that of a mediator between the two countries. Little headway was made in the negotiations. One of the key reasons for this was because in the 1969-1971 peace efforts the United States appeared to identify itself with a "preferred settlement outline" which, in effect, violated her role as an impartial mediator. Meanwhile, Israel's staunch position of holding on to occupied territories began to weaken its position in the eyes of the world (18:77). President Sadat had dismissed Soviet technicians from Egypt in 1972 but saw no apparent move by Israel or the United States to settle the Arab-Israeli problem. Force appeared to be the only way to regain lost territories. In Israel: The Embattled Ally, Nadav Safran stated "Egypt enlisted Syrian participation and went to war in October 1973 to break an unbearable stalemate and reactive diplomacy [96:476]."

Arab nationalism and the use of oil as an Arab political weapon highlighted the Yom Kippur War which began on October 6, 1973. Egyptian and Syrian forces staged a surprise attack on this Jewish holy day. Though initially incurring a weak position, Israel was able to recover. Israeli military forces moved to within twenty

miles of the Syrian capital and also overcame Egyptian lines to the south. The United Nations adopted a ceasefire resolution on October 22. The Soviets wanted the USSR and the United States to supervise the truce. This idea was rejected by the United States in favor of a U.N. observer force. Tension between the Soviets and Americans increased until finally Moscow agreed to an international peace-keeping force (18:77). It was on November 11 that Egypt and Israel signed a six-point ceasefire with the aid of United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

The use of oil as a political weapon was more effective in the 1973 war than it had been at the end of the 1967 Six Day War. The sense of timing in the 1967 war was probably one of the reasons the embargo was less effective. Had the embargo been initiated during the war, the results may have been different. By 1973, increasing Arab solidarity enhanced the oil embargo. Saudi Arabia played a key role in the success of the 1973 boycott. Prior to Nasser's death in 1970, Saudi Arabia's King Faisal feared that if oil was used as a weapon for the Arab cause that Nasser might overshadow Saudi Arabia and dictate the use of the oil as a weapon (18:138; 97:221).

The 1973 Yom Kippur War had a significant effect on Israeli-American relations. Safran pointed out that of the major premises that the United States held prior to

the war, few still remained intact (96:503). As a result, the United States looked to mending relations with the Arab nations after the 1973 war (18:90). President Nixon visited Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Israel; he was the first American President ever to do so. The tense position that the Americans found themselves in with the Soviets in attempting to provide a ceasefire agreement at the war's end was also a critical issue. Such an occurrence attested to the fact that in a heat of crisis United States and Soviet Union interests could easily clash in the Middle East. With such serious possible consequences, a new approach to diplomacy had to be taken by the United States.

United States Involvement
Since 1973

Henry Kissinger became an important contributor to this new diplomacy. Adding a mixture of personal diplomacy with global diplomacy (Geneva Conference), he felt that a solution might be achieved through a step-by-step process. In an interview on July 24, 1974, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., described this step-by-step diplomacy as "you take a problem at a time, recognizing that solving each step along the way is not the end of the road but simply a beginning or one more step down the road [5:6]." The emphasis was to be on

trust and the development of that trust. Secretary Kissinger accurately described the new approach to diplomacy in this way:

For 30 years it proved nearly impossible even to begin the process of negotiation. Every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed . . . The United States therefore concluded that instead of seeking to deal with all problems at once we should proceed step by step with the parties prepared to negotiate and on the issues where some room for maneuver seemed possible. We believe that once the parties began a negotiating process, they would develop a stake in success. Solutions to problems more easily negotiable would build mutual confidence [Quoted in 73:19].

Although criticized for avoiding the heart of the issue, the Palestinian problem, Kissinger saw the steps that were attained as the best to date. With Kissinger "the prevailing domestic situation" made the move for Middle East peace difficult. What is referred to here is the Israeli lobby and the lobby's ability to sway public and Congressional support in the United States. By 1975, the settlement to the Arab-Israeli issue appeared to include returning to the 1967 borders with some modification to those borders. Kissinger wanted President Ford to convey to the American public via the media the issues in the Middle East in order to counter possible Jewish objections. But the Jewish lobby rallied Senate support and in the final outcome Kissinger's option had to be tabled (18:90-91). The effectiveness of the Jewish lobby to gain support not only in the United States Congress but throughout America has, no doubt, been a tremendous asset

to the Jewish nation. Unquestionably, American Middle East policy is greatly affected by American domestic politics.

During his presidential campaign, Carter stressed the need to curb the supply of weapons to the world. Once elected, President Carter had our military sales policies reviewed and in May, 1977 announced that arms transfer would be viewed as an "exceptional foreign policy implement." However, by mid-1977, arms sales continued to the tune of \$4.5 billion worldwide. Heavy sales went to both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Egypt was being considered as a possible recipient (18:93). Over \$360 million in military equipment was provided to Israel in the summer of 1977.

To the Middle East question, Carter's plan envisioned three main points. First, Israeli withdrawal to approximately the 1967 borders. Second, the creation of a Palestinian homeland. Third, the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The concept of a Palestinian homeland was an important one for it represents a realization that the Palestinians must be involved in the process of a peace settlement.

The major stumbling block in the peace proposals still tends to be the first point, the 1967 border question. Begin's Likud party victory in Israel added a barrier. The party adamantly refused to consider the

idea of returning the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip territories.

In a press conference on March 9, 1977, President Carter emphasized that the United States would mount a major effort in our own government to bring the parties to Geneva. By October 5, 1977, the United States and Israel issued a joint statement:

The United States and Israel agree that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the agreed basis for resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference and that all understandings and agreements between them on this subject remain in force [88:1].

Two days later a joint Soviet-American statement on the Middle East was set forth. By November, President Carter saw a historic breakthrough in the search for a permanent and lasting peace as a result of President Sadat's and Prime Minister Begin's leadership. The crucial question was whether Egypt could represent the other Arab parties and Palestinians (11:3). President Carter's visits to Egypt and Israel early in 1978 were to mark the beginning of an important year. Plans to sell F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia and Israel and F-5 aircraft to Egypt were approved by the Senate in May. President Carter stated that "the Senate vote strengthens our ties with moderate Arab nations who share our goal of peace and stability in the region [12]."

By September, a historic meeting at Camp David took place between President Carter, President Sadat and

Prime Minister Begin. A framework for peace was constructed and signed. Both the text of agreements and framework for the conclusion of the peace treaty are included in Appendix B.

In the exchange of remarks by the three leaders on September 17, 1978, President Carter outlined the major issues that had been agreed on. First, the future of the West Bank and Gaza territories and the need to resolve the Palestinian problem was addressed. Since the two issues of West Bank and Gaza territories and the Palestinian question are so complex and cannot be resolved at once, a five-year transition period was constructed in the framework for peace to settle these two issues. During this time, the Israeli military government would withdraw from the occupied territories and a self-governing authority would be elected. Israeli forces could remain in specific locations during the transition period to protect the security of Israel. The Palestinians were also ceded the right to determine their future in the negotiations which would lead to the final resolve to the West Bank and Gaza questions. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 would be the basis for future negotiations. Second, within the framework of conclusion to the peace treaty, Egypt would exercise full sovereignty over the Sinai. Full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai would be accomplished expeditiously.

An issue not resolved during the Camp David Summit was Egyptian demands that Israeli settlements be removed from Egyptian territory as a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel said this question of Israeli settlements should be resolved in the peace negotiations which were to follow (113:3-4).

The major obstacle to realizing success in the Camp David Summit occurred shortly after the negotiations. On the day of the signing, Prime Minister Begin, in a letter to President Carter, said that the issue of Israeli settlements would have to be submitted in a motion before the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset). The basis of the party platform Begin was elected on was the refusal to consider returning the occupied West Bank and Gaza territories. In the final analysis then, the real question was not whether President Sadat was recognized as the spokesman for the Arabs, but whether Prime Minister Begin could act unilaterally for Israel. The Knesset declared that:

The attitude of the U.S. administration, which placed the responsibility for the failure to sign the peace treaty on Israel, is one-sided, unjust and does not contribute to the furtherance of peace [1:28].

Since the summit, not only has the Palestinian issue been a subject of further debate, but Sadat has asked for two changes in the draft treaty (1:27). Serious disagreements over the interpretation of the draft treaty have

greatly hindered peace initiatives since the Camp David Summit.

To the United States, the summit meeting was aimed at several objectives. These were outlined by Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in an address on November 17, 1978, in Atlanta, Georgia. First, the summit was aimed at finding a peace that "will benefit all the people of the Middle East while serving American interests [23:12-13]." Second, the commitment of the United States to Israel was reaffirmed. Third, the summit added further strength to deepening United States ties with the Arab world. Fourth, it eased the danger of the Middle East becoming a focus or flash point of conflict between the great powers that could lead to nuclear war. Fifth, it helped contribute to narrowing the gap between technologically advanced countries and the developing nations. Finally, if accepted by the parties and supported internationally, the agreements could become "a bulwark for further efforts to establish peace and cooperation among all nations [23:12-13]."

The sensitive issues of the occupied West Bank and Gaza territories and the Palestinian issue caused further negotiations concerning the Camp David agreement to falter. By early 1979, President Carter had to make personal visits to Egypt and Israel in an effort to

advance the stalled negotiations. The visits proved effective as an agreement was reached. Appendix C contains a text of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that resulted from President Carter's initiatives. While the September, 1978 Camp David agreement addressed the West Bank and Gaza issues, the new Israeli-Egyptian treaty did not. Thus, a subject of major disagreement was not addressed. Furthermore, the signing of the treaty caused a new problem to emerge--the Egyptians have been chastized by other Arab states in the Middle East for supporting the new treaty. President Sadat has taken a tremendous gamble with neighboring Arab states as economic support from those states, especially Saudi Arabia, remains questionable (31:A23). Once economic support is cut by Egypt's Arab neighbors, the United States will have to provide support if the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is to survive.

In Iran, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by religious factions has had a serious impact on United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The United States supported the Shah with massive amounts of foreign military assistance. "Over 30 percent of United States foreign military sales went to Iran prior to the Shah's ouster," said Air Force Brigadier General Richard Secord, USAF Director of International Programs. With the overthrow of the Shah, a serious power vacuum has been created in the Persian Gulf area. Because of the fall of the Shah, the United States has had to become more active

in dealing with other Middle East nations in order to protect American interests. In a January 8, 1979, issue of U.S. News and World Report, an article emphasized that Iran is not the only country in question. Iran is a symptom of an area where "the entire structure of U.S. influence in the strategic, oil-rich Persian Gulf teeters on the edge of collapse [118:20]." The January 18, 1979 Wall Street Journal reported that the impact of the Iranian episode was so significant that "the crisis represented by the turmoil might well mark the end of an era for American foreign policy [59:16]."

Summary

The historical perspective conducted in this chapter has allowed construction of a solid foundation from which further analysis of three major issues affecting United States foreign policy in the Middle East can be examined. It has been shown that the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the major issues affecting American foreign policy. However, the importance of oil in the Middle East and the Soviet threat in that region are also major issues that have contributed to the development of American foreign policy. These three issues have surfaced in the historical perspective and are fundamental issues that should be examined in depth if one is to have a better understanding of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The tip of the iceberg is now in view,

but an in depth examination of the underlying events that created these issues is required. Thus, the hidden portion of the iceberg will be examined beginning with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

CHAPTER IV

ISSUES AFFECTING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Introduction

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a complex crisis consisting of several issues that must be understood if an effective foreign policy is to be sought in the Middle East. Both the Israeli and Arab positions must be studied in order to understand what gains may be made in a solution to the conflict. This chapter concentrates on the four most important issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are: (1) the struggle between Judaism and Islam and the significance of the land to each, (2) Arab nationalism, (3) the Arab refugees, and (4) the Palestinian resistance movement. Of these four issues, the conflict of religion creates the greatest turmoil.

Religion and the Land

The Arab-Israeli conflict does not have a single cause nor a simple cure. The conflict is composed of several issues that must be fully understood and dealt with if a solution to the conflict is ever to be achieved. Any United States peace attempt that ignores these issues will have only marginal success. The issues of religion

and the significance of the land of Israel to religion, especially Jerusalem, is at the very heart of the conflict. Israel is a Jewish nation that was created by a religious desire to regain a "promised land." Since 1948, the United States has pledged itself to the survival of Israel (15:289). The United States has fully supported that commitment, even when support meant a substantial decrease in the United States' own military capability. This fact was clearly stated by a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown (121). He was concerned by the rapid depletion of United States arms in support of Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In that war, the United States supplied Israel with two billion dollars in arms (8:208-209). One may ask what caused this deeply felt commitment on the part of the United States. The answer is again complex with no single event as its cause, but the issue of religion and what is morally right by Christian and Jewish beliefs were distinctive factors.

The United States is a nation whose religious affiliation is mostly Christian. Minority religions do exist, and strong among these is the Jewish religion. The United States, however, has had little exposure to Islam (67:9). The forerunner of Christianity was Judaism (81:27). The Old Testament of the Christian Bible is a history of the Jewish people and their religion. Moses,

the prophet who freed the Jews from Egypt, presented the Ten Commandments that are followed by both religions. The Christian Bible and the Jewish Torah both relate in the Book of Genesis the same story of how God gave the land of Canaan to Abraham, the Father of the Jews, in return for his denial of all other gods. With these common events of God giving the land of Israel to the Jews, the Ten Commandments of Moses, and the commonality of the land as each religion's birthplace, the Jewish and Christian religions are closely tied. If a person is a professed Christian, he believes in the Old Testament as well as the New Testament. Thus, Christians also believe that God gave the land of Israel to the Jews. The Jewish claim to Israel is morally right in the eyes of Christianity. This is one factor that has led to the close affiliation of the United States and Israel, the commonality of the Christian and Jewish religions. How does Islam fit into the Arab-Israeli conflict, and what is Islam?

The actual teachings of Islam are not fully understood by many Christian nations (67:9). To most Christians who are physically removed from the Middle East, Islam is an unfamiliar religion. These people recognize Islam as being peculiar to the Arabs of the Middle East and having something to do with the teachings of a prophet named Muhammad. They also believe that Islam has caused the Arabs to live in a backward society and resent any

attempts at modernization (67:9; 117; 121). The recent events in Iran have helped to reinforce this view. To understand the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, one must have a basic knowledge of what Islam is and its affiliation with the land of Israel.

The first myth to dispel before entering into a discussion of the basic beliefs of Islam is that Islam is a minority religion peculiar only to the Arabs of the Middle East. It is true that Islam originated in the Middle East, but the religion has a following of some 750 million adherents and is second only to the Christian religion (119:40). Muslims, the followers of Islam, stretch across the eastern hemisphere. They are found in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. Even the Soviet Union is not untouched by Islam as it contains some fifty million Muslims (119:46). As Marilyn Waldman of Ohio State University said, "There is another world that thinks different than us [117]." Islam will have to be accommodated by United States foreign policy in areas of the world other than the Middle East. We in the United States must stop thinking that human history has moved from the East to the West and has stayed there. The people of the East must be understood and that includes their religion (117).

Origins of Islam

Islam originated in what is now Saudi Arabia in the seventh century. The Father of Islam was Muhammad

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people the word of God and the way to live. Eventually the Jewish people diverged from the word of God, so God, through Jesus, sent down a redirection for the people. Again the people started to digress from God's word. Finally, God sent down through Muhammad another redirection for the people to follow. This redirection is Islam, and it is nothing more than a continuation of the word of God that was given to Moses and Jesus (81:79-85; 67:25). What Muhammad did was to manifest the Jewish book, the Torah, and the Christian book, the Evangel, into one book, the Koran (81:85). Muhammad related that God told him that if those who had been given the Book, the Jews and Christians, should fail to accept the messages, the Book would then be entrusted to another people, meaning to a people who did accept the message (81:91). These new people were the Muslims, but the Jews and the Christians were still "people of the book."

The idea of monotheism was not new or unheard of in the region where Muhammad lived. There were substantial Jewish and Christian communities throughout the Middle East (81:60-65; 79:20). Muhammad and the other Arabs of the time were familiar with these teachings and had close associations with both Jewish and Christian communities. Mecca, the birthplace of Muhammad, was a city situated on well established trade routes, and Muhammad had the opportunity to meet and associate with

people of both the Jewish and Christian faith. In fact, Muhammad himself made trips along these trade routes. He journeyed into Syria and other areas where he became familiar with both the Jewish and Christian religions. It is due to Muhammad's acquaintances along the trade routes that he became familiar with the stories of the two monotheistic religions. These stories were encountered verbally and not through readings (81:65-72; 67:11-12). This explains how Muhammad began his belief in monotheism and gained a foundation upon which to build Islam. Thus, Islam is closely aligned with Judaism and Christianity and seeks religious affiliation with the land of Israel.

The Islamic Faith

The Muslims believe that Muhammad's book, the Koran, completes and supersedes all previous revelations (67:25). Consequently, the Muslims believe that they are closer to God than either the Jews or Christians. In fact, this makes the Jews and Christians both Muslims (67:25). The importance of this belief is that God supports the Arabs of the Middle East in their struggle with Israel. The Jews are a "people of the book," but they have strayed from the word of God. One of the most basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict is this confrontation between the religions. Both sides view themselves as following God's will. This issue must be recognized by United States

foreign policy, and that a reconciliation on religious grounds of the two sides cannot be accomplished by any one nation or a group of nations.

Another aspect of Islam that needs understanding is the hierarchial society of the Arab Muslims. The highest class of society within an Arab Muslim state is the Arab Muslim. He is followed by the non-Arab Muslim convert and then by the "people of the book." These "people of the book" are the Jews and Christians that live within Muslim territory (67:33). The Arab Muslim believes that in dealing with Israel he is dealing with a society of people that are two stations below his status in the eyes of God. Remember, the Arab Muslims believe that the Jewish God, the Christian God, and the Muslim God are one in the same. The difference is that only the Muslims are following God's word as God requires. Thus, neither Christian nor Jewish nations are equal to the Muslim nations in the eyes of God. This aspect of their belief is reinforced in that the Muslim nations make no distinction between state and religion. They believe that they are one (117; 121). This poses a dilemma in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Jews believe that God gave Israel to them, whereas, the Arab nations believe that the Jews fail to follow the word of God and that they are inferior to Muslims in the eyes of God. What complicates matters is that the Muslim countries do not make a distinction

between God and state. This notion was reinforced by the Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran when he said, "We Muslims are one family even though we live under different governments and in various regions [119:40]." This religious problem overshadows the entire Arab-Israeli conflict and must be recognized by the United States. A political settlement of the conflict may end outright hostilities, but it will never reconcile the opposing religious differences between the Jews and the Arabs. Islam cannot recognize a Jewish state on land that was once Arab. This religious conflict is not subject to a political settlement.

The Land

The land Israel now occupies has significance to both the Jews and Arabs (84:239-242). The Jewish claim to the land was highlighted previously in Chapter III. Basically, the Jewish heritage is attached to Israel, for it is the land from which they were displaced centuries ago. Throughout history, the story of the Jew is one of a struggle to survive while waiting for a return to the "promised land." The land is filled with religious shrines and locations that have tremendous significance in Judaism. Unfortunately, Judaism does not have sole claim to the religious locations within Israel. Both the Christians and the Muslims bear similar claims (52:230; 100:25-33). The Christians do not profess that God gave them the land, but the Arab Muslims believe that the land

is Muslim. Muhammad's teachings say that Muslim ownership of the land is God's will. Territorial expansion is a basic part of Muhammad's preachings, and several Arab wars have been waged in its belief (117;121). The Arabs also claim that 2,000 years of ownership makes the land theirs.

The most difficult question concerning peace in the Middle East is what to do with the Arab land captured during the 1967 war between the Arabs and Israelis. The United States and most major powers have signed a United Nations resolution pressing for the return of that land to the Arabs (84:277-279). The Sinai is being returned to Egypt under a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace signed in early 1979 (111). The other captured land poses a more formidable problem. The Golan Heights, captured from Syria, poses a strategic question of defense that might be overcome with a political solution. The remaining captured land, the West Bank and Jerusalem, however, poses a religious problem. All three of the monotheistic religions have religious shrines in the area. For the Jews, the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Temple are located in that area. The Jews claim great religious affiliation with Jerusalem and have no intention of returning the West Bank to Muslim control (3:49). In fact, the Israelis want Jerusalem for their capital city (76:98). The Muslims also have a great affiliation with the West Bank. Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam (44:114).

Only Mecca and Medina hold more religious significance. Jerusalem is important to Islam in that it is where Muhammad is said to have made his famous "Night Journey" prior to his ascent to the seventh heaven (44:114-116; 100:29). The Wailing Wall also has significance for the Muslims as well as the Jews. It is the halting-place of the Buraq, a winged horse on which Muhammad journeyed heavenward (84:245). Jerusalem also contains the Dome of the Rock, a magnificent Islamic shrine (100:29; 92:76). The Christians also have religious shrines in Jerusalem. The solution to the West Bank is indeed complex and will probably not be solved on religious or political grounds alone. Many times in the past, the concept of Jerusalem becoming an international city open to all religions has been brought forward, but no concrete advances have been made (92:71-79). The willful destruction of any religious shrines located in the West Bank would have grave consequences in any peace effort.

Many Arabs believe in what Arie Loua Eliav calls the crusader theory. This is an Arab theory of how the land of Israel will eventually revert back to Arab control. The theory calls for the return of the land to the Muslims as it was returned following the Christian crusades. During the Christian crusades, the Christians seized and took land in what is now Israel. They remained some two hundred years before an Islamic leader, Saladin,

came forth and drove out the Christians. The reason for his success was that the Christians became divided and were not originally of the land. Today, this theory calls for the same result. It claims the Jews are not originally of the land, but immigrated just as the crusaders. Eventually the Jews will become divided and a new Saladin will come forth and drive the Jews from Israel (29:111-117). This theory is full of religious belief and mysticism, but many Arab Muslims believe it. Again, the religious beliefs of the Middle East are at the root of future events. Just as the Jews believed that their return to Israel was God's will, the Muslims believe that their return to Israel will be God's will. This confrontation of the two religions supported by God's will makes the issue difficult if not impossible to completely solve on the political level. The Muslims think of government and religion as being one and the same. The importance of religion to both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be understood if effective foreign policy is to be achieved in the Middle East.

Arab Nationalism

Arab nationalism is another factor in the complex design of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The spirit of nationalism in the Arab world had its beginnings in the early nineteenth century with the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon (43:21-22). Napoleon's invasion of the Arab

world not only gave the Arabs an invader to unite against, but also a most effective means to further communications to help foster nationalism, the Arabic press. During this period of contact with the West, the Arabs gained a sense of identity and nationalism. Arab commercial relations, migration to the West, and close association with Western educational and missionary activities in Arab lands gave the Arab people a stimulus for a nationalistic spirit and desire (43:21-23). After Napoleon, the United States became the most influential Western power in creating an atmosphere for fostering Arab nationalism. Because of this Western influence, a nationalistic spirit of furthering the Arab states as political entities began to evolve (43:21-23).

The next major event that spurred Arab nationalism was World War I (80:40-42). For centuries prior to World War I, the Arab states were under the Ottoman Empire. Most Arabs resented their lives and land being controlled by a foreign, non-Arab power. They wanted Arab rule over Arab lands (80:40-42). World War I gave the Arabs the opportunity to rid themselves of Turkish rule and establish their own self-rule. The British gave the Arabs the needed big power backing required. The British promised the Arabs independence if they would help the British drive the Ottomans out of the Middle East. The events of World War I in the Middle East strongly strengthened Arab

nationalism, for the Arabs were fighting for independence and national identity.

The next rallying point for Arab nationalism was the Zionist movement into Palestine following World War I (80:41). This stimulus for nationalism is still in the Middle East today and plays a part in the continuing crisis. The Arabs felt that the British had promised them the land now under Israeli control. When the Jews moved into Arab land and a move toward a Jewish state became evident, Arab nationalism rose to a new high. The Arabs felt that they had fought for the land against the Ottoman Empire, were promised it by the British, and had lived on it for some 2,000 years. It was their land over which to maintain political sovereignty. The confrontation over Palestine did more to bring nationalism to the limelight in the Arab world than any other event in the history of the Middle East (80:41-42). The confrontation over the Jewish state still continues today and fuels the spirit of Arab nationalism.

In examining the Arab-Israeli conflict thus far, it can be seen that the issues of religion and land have important historical, deeply rooted significance. With the establishment of the state of Israel two other important factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged. One of those factors was the Arab refugee problem, and the other was the Palestine resistance movement.

The Arab Refugee Problem

It is ironic that the displaced Jews of Europe who settled in Palestine would displace another group of people and cause a refugee problem to develop in the Middle East. Many Arabs who had made their home in Palestine prior to the formation of the state of Israel would be displaced as the Arab-Israeli conflict intensified through the years. Fred Khouri described the Arab refugee problem in this way:

The Palestine War uprooted hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arabs, Christian as well as Muslim, and turned most of them into bitter, resentful, and restless refugees living in crowded camps near the borders of Israel. Over the years the number of refugees steadily rose, their bitterness and discontent intensified, and their political influence increased and spread throughout the Arab world. Then came the June, 1967 war. The defeat of the Arabs and the extensive territorial acquisition of the Israelis in some way radically altered--but did not improve--the refugee situation. By suddenly bringing hundreds of thousands of Palestine refugees under Israeli control, by driving many thousands from their homes and camps once again, and by forcing tens of thousands of Syrians, Jordanians and Egyptians to join the ranks of the refugees for the first time, Israel's military victory added formidable new dimensions and complications to the already perplexing refugee problem [55:123].

The refugee problem that originated in Israel spread to neighboring Middle East Arab states. Soon the involvement of those Arab nations would intensify the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When the U.N. General Assembly approved the partition resolution in November, 1947, over 30,000 upper and middle class Arabs left Palestine. Since many of those

who left were key people in numerous Palestine Arab communities, a serious breakdown occurred in economic, communications, and administrative services and in political leadership among Arabs in Palestine (55:123). The 1948-1949 War resulted in some 550,000 to 729,000 (estimates are in dispute) Palestinian refugees. Some of these Arabs left on their own volition, fearing Israeli reprisals; some were physically or psychologically forced to leave by the Israelis; and some left on advice from neighboring Arab states. These refugees settled primarily in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and various Arab countries (106:5). Furthermore, Israel continued to encourage large numbers of Jewish immigrants to enter Israel quickly and used them as an "argument as to why Israel could not allow the Arabs to return [55:127]." Some 450,000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands were absorbed by Israel (27:158-159). Safran said that "the principal aim of the Jews was to gain effective control over the territory allotted to them by the United Nations partition plan [96:46]." President Truman voiced his disappointment with Israel's failure to make concessions allowing Arabs to return to Palestine and even threatened that the United States would be forced to reconsider its attitude toward Israel (55:127; 13:67; 83:42). Finally, the Israelis modified their position slightly, allowing some refugees to return but the problem was far from solved.

Since the United Nations had approved the partition resolution, and this resolution had led to the conflict between Arabs and Jews and eventual Arab refugee problem, the United Nations would also play an important part in attempting to settle the refugee problem. As Arab refugee needs overwhelmed the limited resources of neighboring Arab states, these states appealed to the U.N. for assistance. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 212(III) passed in November, 1948, focused on the humanitarian aspect of the refugee problem. A Director of U.N. Relief for Palestine Refugees was appointed and \$5,000,000 was immediately drawn from the U.N. Working Capital Fund to start relief operations. Resolution 194(III), passed in December, 1948, established a Conciliation Commission responsible for taking steps to help achieve a final peace settlement and to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation to refugees (55:126; 13:66).

Large scale developmental projects were also pursued by the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) to relieve neighboring Arab states of the refugee problem. In Jordan, where the majority of refugees fled, the Jordan Valley project was begun. A second project was started in Egypt to relieve the problems faced by 200,000 refugees crowded into a 135 square mile area of the Gaza. As well

as large scale projects, small scale projects were also implemented and often these plans proved to be more successful (83:19-30).

But the UNRWA attempt had as its objective humanitarian relief and with the passage of time the Arab refugee problem became more intertwined with the political climate of the Middle East. As the political climate remained unfavorable, most U.N. members felt it would be futile, and even harmful, to push for a solution to the refugee problem before the Arabs and Israelis were ready (55:148).

While early U.N. actions had focused on repatriation, later the U.N. became concerned with resettlement in Arab states (83:3). Acceptance of settling in Arab states could have been perceived by the Arabs as an acceptance of the plight of displaced Palestinian refugees who had little chance of returning to their homeland. The more the U.N. concentrated on the refugee problem and the longer the problem grew in complexity, the more the U.N. realized that hopes for a solution were fading (55:161). Don Peretz said "the longer the refugee problem remained unsolved, the more difficult became restoration of the status which the Arabs had had in mandated Palestine [83:241]." After attempting to achieve a solution, the U.N. Conciliation Commission realized that the Arab and Israeli views were irreconcilable and subsequently the

Commission failed to make any headway in solving either the political or humanitarian aspects of the Palestinian problem (46:189).

Reactions to the refugees by Arab states did not aid in settling the problem. Although Jordan and Syria told the Conciliation Commission they would accept refugees who did not want to be repatriated, Egypt and Lebanon said they were already too overpopulated to accept any large numbers of refugees (55:128). In a Washington letter on American policy in the Near East, Myths and Facts 1976, the dilemma Arab refugees were experiencing in neighboring Arab states was described:

But the less than 600,000 Arabs who left what is now Israel to escape the conflict did not fare so well with their brothers. Instead of offering support to the Arab refugees, most Arab governments spurned any suggestion of refugee integration as a cunning device to "solve" the Palestinian problem. They insisted that they remain refugees, living in separate camps, as an exhibit of Arab defiance of the U.N. The Arab governments preferred to leave the burden of caring for the Arab refugees with the world community in general, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in particular [76:53].

From May 1, 1950, through June 30, 1975, Israel had donated more to UNRWA than any Arab state except Saudi Arabia. Also, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel made direct contributions to the refugees and Israel's \$10,564,440 contribution was exceeded only by Jordan's \$23,032,292 (76:64). It is interesting to note that when these contributions are broken down into average annual contributions, neither the Arabs nor the Jews made any

significant contribution toward remedying the refugee problem.

Further evidence of the Arab nations' reluctance to solve the refugee problem can be found. Jordan was the only neighboring Arab state to accept the refugees as citizens and allow them to work. Lebanon and Syria did not offer the refugees citizenship (86:21-22). Iraq and Libya were willing to absorb less than 10,000 refugees each (55:134). Nasser confined the refugees to the Gaza Strip and his actions drew criticism from Saudi Arabia. On March 10, 1962, a Saudi radio broadcast equated Nasser's rule in Gaza to Hitler's rule in occupied territories in World War II (76:63).

The Arab refugee influence in neighboring Arab states intensified the Arab-Israeli conflict. Refugees themselves turned their situation into a major political issue throughout the Middle East and no Arab leader could ignore it (55:162). During the 1950s, increased government instability in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and the rise of inter-Arab tension and rivalries for leadership in the Arab world hindered achieving a solution to the refugee problem (55:138-139).

To the Israelis, the Arab refugee problem and its solution rested with the Arabs. On November 17, 1958, Abba Eban, Chief Israeli representative to the United Nations at the time, said:

The Arab refugee problem was caused by a war of aggression, launched by the Arab States against Israel in 1947 and 1948. Let there be no mistake. If there had been no war against Israel, with its consequent harvest of bloodshed, misery, panic and flight, there would be no problem of Arab refugees today. Once you determine the responsibility for that war, you have determined the responsibility for the refugee problem [27:151].

Don Peretz also agreed that the refugee problem was "germinated by the conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalisms in Palestine [83:4]."

Khoury cited Israel's basic contentions concerning the Arab refugees as: (1) the cause and solution to the refugee problem was the responsibility of the Arabs; (2) Arab governments did not aid the refugees but used them for political ends, pressuring them to oppose resettlement; (3) the Arab world, large and rich in resources, could absorb the refugees; (4) the refugees would be more content settled in Arab countries with their own people; and (5) the continued existence of a state of war with the Arabs and a lack of space in Israel made repatriation unacceptable (55:161).

Israel also overtly hindered the Arab refugee return. In 1967, the U.N. passed Resolution 237. The resolution called for Israel to help facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities. Coupled with this resolution, Western governments' pressure and key support from several Israeli officials resulted in the approval by the Israeli

cabinet to allow West Bank refugees to return conditionally. The approval passed by a narrow margin and only after vigorous objections and debate. The processing of the Arab refugee return, however, led to problems. For example, only thirty days were provided for acceptance of applications for those refugees desiring readmission. Furthermore, prior proof of residence on the West Bank, health and customs clearance, and security checks were required. Finally, only those Arabs who left the area prior to July 5, 1967, were eligible to apply for readmission (55:152-153). As a result of these administrative complications, Arab states objected. Delays ensued and Israel extended the deadline, but only by twenty-one days. By the end of that time, 170,000 refugees had completed forms, but Israel had only readmitted 14,000 persons (55:154). To some, Israel's unsympathetic attitude was hard to understand and Fred Khouri described the Israeli position in this way:

Since for 2,000 years the Jews had been able to keep alive their hope of returning to Israel, it should not have been difficult for them to understand the Arab refugees' unquenchable yearning to return to their homes, many of which were still within actual sight [55:163].

Since the 1967 war, a basic aggravating factor which has compounded the refugee problem was the "occupation by Israeli forces of various territories in Palestine in excess of the boundaries fixed for the Jewish state by the United Nations partition resolution [13:53]."

Many of the Palestinian refugees who were displaced from their Palestinian homes during the 1948-1949 hostilities were made refugees for the second time in 1967 (18:109). Their bitterness and resentment against the Israelis increased.

As well as the five contentions cited earlier as Israel's reasons for objecting to the refugee return to Palestine, two other reasons should be mentioned. First, with the passage of time and the intensifying of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab hostilities hardened Israel's attitude. Second, Israel feared that massive Arab repatriation would dangerously weaken Israel's internal security (27:162). Also, the Arab minority in Israel maintained close ties to refugees across the borders. This created a situation of deep psychological problems of divided loyalties and emotions (83:90-91).

Thus, United Nations, Israeli, and Arab actions did not solve the Arab refugee problem nor contribute to a favorable atmosphere for solving the problem. In its most rudimentary form, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the result of two peoples with opposing cultures, opposing political and religious beliefs, and opposing philosophies of their historical right to the land in Palestine, attempting to occupy the same parcel of land at the same time. Such a dilemma was bound to lead to active opposition, and Palestinian resistance resulted.

Palestinian Resistance

An awareness of the necessity to take the lead in achieving a redress of Palestinian grievances arose in the 1950s among some Palestinians. These Palestinians were not convinced that Arab governments, if left to themselves, would bring about "the desired confrontation with Israel in the foreseeable future [90:157]." Thus, Palestinians increased their resistance movements (90:157).

One of the earliest Palestinian guerrilla or fedayeen bands originated in the Gaza Strip. Organized by Egyptian Intelligence, these Palestinians conducted sabotage and terrorism missions into Israel in 1955-1956 (96:266). Don Peretz described the effects the UNRWA refugee camp conditions, including those camps in the Gaza, had on the refugees:

Although by the end of 1956 only 38.9 percent of the registered refugees lived in UNRWA camps, nearly all drew United Nations rations
. . . But a trip through the refugee camps was enough to convince an observer that these figures told little of the refugee plight. Many living in leaky, torn tents were middle-class urbanites who had owned modest but adequate houses in their native land. In Palestine their social life was built on a family system which was smothered in the overcrowded, sweltering encampments. The self-reliance and individual initiative of former tradesmen and farmers were drowned in the boredom and frustration which the camps bred. . . . Despite UNRWA's excellent relief record--there was little doubt that its operations had kept most of the refugees alive--the psychological and emotional impact of the situation endangered Middle East stability. Smoldering resentment against their status and living conditions brought refugee tension to a combustion point . . . [83:20].

Because of growing resentment, many of these refugees became involved in resistance movements over the years. According to plans developed by Arab leaders in a 1964 summit meeting, military training would be given to thousands of refugees. These refugees were to form the basis of the Palestine Liberation Army (55:170).

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian armed resistance in the Middle East took on a sudden growth (90:157). Palestinian nationalists viewed the 1967 Arab defeat as an indicator that unified Arab action was failing in helping Palestinians achieve their goals. Palestinians wanted to pursue their interests on their own and this position became a strong basis for independent Palestinian action (90:150). The number of Palestinian guerrillas increased significantly. Nadav Safran stated that coping with the Palestinian guerrillas was one of the most serious problems faced by Israel after the 1967 Six Day War (96:266). Safran described how that war added impetus to the guerrilla movement:

The Six Day War turned them [Palestinian guerrillas] into the only remaining focal point for Arab resistance to Israel at a time of despair and brought to their ranks large numbers of recruits. It induced the governments of the defeated Arab states, eager to prevent Israel from consolidating its conquests, to give them more or less free hand and provide them with bases and weapons [96:266-267].

While there are numerous resistance movement groups among the Arabs, the most noted group is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yasir Arafat.

The most impressive success in PLO activities was raising the issue of Palestinian national claims to the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, the recognition of a Palestinian role in the eventual Arab-Israeli settlement has become more evident in United Nations and United States actions. For example, virtually no reference to Palestinians was included in the November, 1967, U.N. Resolution 242; however, resolutions since 1969 have stressed "the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine [90:149]." In a November, 1975 speech, President Carter stated:

I think one of the integral parts of an ultimate settlement has to be the recognition of the Palestinians as a people, as a nation, with a place to live and a right to choose their own leaders [18:110].

The Carter administration was the first administration to urge the creation of a Palestinian homeland.

On October 14, 1974, the U.N. General Assembly recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The United States, however, voted against the resolution. Even after President Carter spoke out in favor of a Palestinian homeland in March, 1977, in Clinton, Massachusetts, by mid-1977 he had not discussed the role of the PLO. When Prime Minister Begin visited President Carter in the summer of 1977, a major hinderance in planning for the resumption of peace negotiations was how to allow for Palestinian representation. The United States had made "cautious dealings of an indirect nature

concerning the PLO role while Israel vehemently opposed any PLO participation in peace negotiations [18:109]."

The PLO has aimed at liberating not only Israeli conquered territories but all of Israel (96:267). PLO documents have stated that the PLO does not and will not recognize a Jewish state in Israel. At the June Cairo Conference in 1974 the Palestinian National Council (PNC) approved ten major points. Two of these points included:

1. The assertion of the PLO position regarding Resolution 242 is that it obliterates the patriotic and national rights of our people and deals with our people's cause as a refugee problem. Therefore, dealing with this resolution on this basis is rejected on any level of Arab and international dealings, including the Geneva conference.

2. The PLO will struggle by all means, foremost of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people's national, independent and fighting authority on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated [53:22].

Such objectives have caused the Israelis to view the PLO as terrorists and murderers who want to eliminate Israel. Consequently, the Israelis have refused to negotiate with the PLO (18:110). Meanwhile, the PLO has viewed itself as a revolutionary arm of rebels fighting for freedom. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, has said, "I am a rebel, and freedom is my cause [18:113]."

Palestinian guerrillas needed bases to operate from and many of these bases were established in neighboring Arab states. Ironically, the extreme leftist guerrilla position caused as much animosity in the Arab states as it did in Israel. In 1970 King Hussein of Jordan, tired

of Israeli reprisals in his country against the guerrillas, ordered his troops to drive the guerrillas out (106:114; 18:115-116). Lebanese troops also clashed with the guerrillas in Lebanon in May, 1973 (18:116).

Since 1977, the PLO has offered signs of a willingness to negotiate. In one political declaration they showed a willingness to participate on an independent, equal footing in all international conferences dealing with the Palestinian problem (106:270; 18:121). This indicated that the PLO would participate in Geneva negotiations, a position they were opposed to in the June Cairo Conference in 1974. A majority of Palestinian guerrillas have now come out in favor of a negotiated settlement (53:95). Another sign has been the exclusion from Palestinian National Council meetings of those factions "who refuse to consider peaceful coexistence with Israel under any conditions [18:121]." Despite these optimistic signs, the Palestine National Council conference in Cairo in March, 1977, still called for "establishment of a Palestinian state on 'national soil' and a continuation of 'armed struggle' against Israel [106:270]." The PLO's "willingness to negotiate" and its continuation of "armed struggle" positions have confused the United States. Consequently, the United States' position concerning the Palestinians has remained dubious. As William Quandt pointed out:

The United States has refrained from taking a clear position on the issues regarding the Palestinians. In view of their complexity, this may have been a reasonable posture in the short term, but at some point the United States will have to confront the question of Palestinian participation in peace negotiations. Beyond that lie the substantive issues, on which great disagreement exists [89:294].

The choices to be made in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the Palestinian issue and PLO role, will be difficult. The President of the United States will have to make many of these choices, but he will not have the choice of remaining indifferent (89:300).

Summary

The issues affecting the Arab-Israeli conflict are complex, offering no easy solution. The issue of religion is deeply imbedded in the conflict. Historically, religion has played a significant role in the Arab and Jewish societies and will continue to play a significant role in their societies in the future. The issue of religion, then, must be understood whenever any attempt to achieve a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is made. In particular, Jerusalem poses a unique problem in the conflict because of the religious differences between Islam and Judaism.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is also affected by Arab nationalism. The refugee problem, created by the 1948 to 1949 wars and the 1967 Six Day War, has contributed to Arab nationalism. The refugee problem, in turn, added

impetus to the Arab resistance movement for a Palestinian homeland. Hence, all three of these issues; Arab nationalism, the Palestinian refugee problem, and the Palestinian resistance movement have become interrelated and added a great deal of complexity in the quest for a Palestinian homeland.

CHAPTER V

MIDDLE EAST OIL

Introduction

Oil complicates the analysis of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. By itself, oil does not drive foreign policy, but, like the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet threat, oil has had a key impact on American foreign policy in the Middle East. It was not until the energy crisis in 1973, which emerged as a result of the Arab producing nations' oil embargo, that the importance of Middle East oil directly affected the American consumer. The oil embargo caused the Executive Branch and the State Department to survey the effect of oil on foreign policy more closely and thoroughly than ever before. But was the embargo and the resultant energy crisis unforeseeable? What had been the actions taken by the State Department and major United States oil companies prior to the crisis? In an address to the National Press Club in early 1975, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said:

The energy crisis burst upon our consciousness because of sudden, unsuspected events. But its elements have been developing gradually for the better part of two decades. In 1950, the United States was virtually self-sufficient in oil. In 1960, our reliance on foreign oil had grown to 16 percent. In

1973, it had reached 35 percent. If this trend is allowed to continue, the 1980s will see us dependent on imported oil for fully half of our needs. The impact on our lives will be revolutionary [Quoted in 56:237].

Thus, two important topics for consideration emerge.

First, since the energy crisis had been developing for over two decades, the historical factors have played an important part in this crisis and should be examined further.

Second, the increasing dependency on foreign oil by the United States also merits closer analysis.

This chapter traces the historical development of United States involvement in Middle East oil. Since a thorough analysis required tracing United States involvement to its earliest roots, this analysis begins with the early years of British dominance in Middle East oil and describes how and why United States interests in Middle East oil developed. Next, the role of the seven major oil companies--Exxon (formerly Esso), Shell, British Petroleum (BP), Gulf, Texaco, Mobil, and Socal (Chevron)--and the effect of these "Seven Sisters" in Middle East oil and foreign policy will be discussed. Since the complexity of the oil issue is so all embracing, four significant historical occurrences will also be discussed. First, Iran's attempt under Mohammed Mossadeq to nationalize oil in 1951. Second, the creation and impact of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Third, Libya's successful showdown with the oil companies

in 1970 which set the stage for the shift from oil company-dominated to country-dominated oil policy throughout the Middle East. Finally, the 1973 oil embargo and the effects of the embargo. Each of these four historical occurrences will be closely examined. The role that the major oil companies have had in the Middle East, the effect of OPEC on United States foreign policy, and the significance of the 1973 oil embargo on American foreign policy in the Middle East are the three research questions discussed in this chapter.

The Early Years of Middle East Oil

The Middle East became an important extension of the British sphere of influence as the British Empire expanded into that region of the world. The defeat of Napoleon in 1799 after his unsuccessful invasion of Egypt resulted in Great Britain occupying a dominant position in the Ottoman Empire and maintaining that position substantially until after World War II (40:18-58). P. Edward Haley in "Britain and the Middle East" said, "The rise of British power in the Middle East began in the nineteenth century and ended in 1914 [40:21]." The continued effects of Great Britain's rise to power existed until the post World War II period when economic considerations at home, a result of the war, forced the British to concentrate on domestic issues. The motive of the British even after

World War II, however, was the preservation of the Middle East "as a shield and passageway of the Asian empire, and to safeguard the strategically vital Middle Eastern oil resources [40:33]." In The Middle East in World Affairs, Lenczowski concluded that Britain's Persian policy was to thwart Russian imperialism southward. The policy itself was "dictated primarily by her [Great Britain] concern for India," and emphasized that Great Britain would act as "guarantor of Persian independence [64:28]."

For the first half of the nineteenth century the British were extremely successful in their move to control Middle East oil. This control of oil in the Middle East was a result of the involvement of Great Britain's power in the Middle East. Haley pointed out that:

. . . even if oil had never been discovered in Persia or Iraq or in Bahrain and Qatar, the general direction of British policy in the Middle East would have been the same [40:32].

Through the use of its great navy, Great Britain extended her influence around the world. When converting from coal to oil, the British government saw Middle East oil as a fuel source for the Royal Navy (40:45; 74:22-23; 98:49-52). While coal was plentiful in the British Isles, if the switch was to be made to oil obtained from distant regions, oil would have to be kept from falling under foreign control. This was a serious subject of concern within the British Parliament. The strategic implications had to be weighed carefully with the tactical advantage of

oil for Britain's navy (74:23). In The Seven Sisters, Anthony Sampson pointed out the importance of oil to Great Britain.

British oil was a long-distance industry which acquired from the beginning an association with national survival and diplomacy, and oil soon seemed part of the empire itself [98:43].

Even Britain's oilmen appeared to be less interested in profits and more concerned with serving Great Britain's empire (98:43).

It was William Knox D'Arcy, described as the "father of the oil industry of the Middle East" by Henry Longhurst in Adventure in Oil, who provided the impetus for Great Britain's oil concessionaire in the Middle East (74:14). He helped form the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909 which became British Petroleum in 1954. In 1914, it was Winston Churchill and Admiral Lord Fisher who pushed for British government involvement in oil. Fearing an "oil starvation" if war broke out with Germany, the British Parliament passed a bill allowing the British government to purchase 51 percent of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (74:27). In 1911, an oil pipeline had been completed from the oil fields in western Iran along the Persian Gulf to Abadan, and by 1912 a refinery was in operation in Abadan (19:119; 74:18). Thus, from early beginnings, direct involvement by the government in Middle East oil was a noted characteristic of British policy.

The United States' interest in Middle East oil did not develop to serious proportions until after World War I. During the war, Clemenceau's and Balfour's requests to President Wilson and United States oil companies for oil to meet critical shortages were honored (32:5). The United States was the world's largest oil producer after the war, providing two-thirds of the world's crude oil output with exports supplying 30 percent of foreign oil consumption. The adequacy of United States oil reserves, supplemented by the fact that only limited action was being taken in only one major foreign oil country, Mexico, heightened anxieties within the United States (42:42; 51:27). The federal government began acting. Direct government intervention was proposed by Senator Phelan who suggested establishing a government corporation for developing oil resources of foreign countries (51:42). The federal government further encouraged private companies to search for foreign oil. In 1921, Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, met with oil company representatives urging them to expand in their foreign producing operations (19:129). Furthermore, foreign countries not allowing oil exportation by United States citizens abroad were denied mineral leases on United States public land (51:27-28).

According to Neil Jacoby in Multinational Oil, by 1919 the United States government declared British oil

policy was aimed at "preparing quietly for exclusive control of the oil resources in this [the Middle East] region [51:28-29]." It was the San Remo Agreement, a special oil agreement signed by Great Britain and France on April 25, 1920, that increased American resentment and resulted in more positive actions by the United States in Middle East oil (51:29; 64:91; 19:119). Under the agreement, France was given Syria and Great Britain was assigned Iraq and Palestine. No United States delegates were present at the actual discussions although the American Ambassador in Rome, Robert Johnson, had been instructed by Washington to attend but not at the correct time. Furthermore, Johnson did not appear to be informed on the issues at hand (63:91). Oil rights under the San Remo Agreement were also partitioned without "providing for any possibility of participation by American interests [19:119]." George Lenczowski described the British-French division of Mesopotamia oil reserves in this way:

In December 1918, before the Peace Conference, Clemenceau and Lloyd George had agreed to the transfer of Mosul from the French to the British sphere of influence. In return, Britain had promised France a share in the Mosul oil deposits. Before the war a concession covering these deposits had been granted by the Ottoman government to the Turkish Petroleum Company. The company was 75 percent British and 25 percent German. On April 18, 1919, M. Berenger, on behalf of France, and Mr. Walter Long, on behalf of Great Britain, signed an agreement by which France was to receive the former German share and to permit the construction of a pipeline across the French mandated area from Mosul to the Mediterranean. This agreement could not, however, be regarded as final as long as the mandates were not officially assigned [64:91-92].

The treaty set forth in Paris at the close of World War I became grounds for argument. Mandate "A" proclamation stated that "no exclusive economic concession covering the whole of any Mandated region or sufficiently large to be virtually exclusive shall be granted [19:128]." This supported the United States' Open Door Policy (19:128).

U.S. Ambassador Davis sent a letter to British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon on May 12, 1920, concerning British oil policy in the Middle Eastern Mandates. In the letter Davis identified that the British government in the occupied region had "given advantage to British oil interests which were not accorded to American Companies [68:38]." Although the British government had stated its desire to "maintain control of oil within these regions in time of national emergency" and the "military necessity" of the agreement, the United States was concerned with the question of the establishment of monopolies and sought further discussion between the two nations (68:37-40). Diplomatic exchanges led to negotiations between the Turkish Petroleum Company and a consortium of seven American companies from 1922 to 1928. Sustained pressures on Great Britain by Washington officials caused the British to offer Americans a 12 percent share, then a 20 percent share. By 1928, American companies had secured a 23.75 percent participation and Britain could no longer claim a monopoly in oil in the area. Equal percentages

were also given to French, Royal Dutch, and Anglo-Persian companies. The remaining 5 percent went to an Armenian oil entrepreneur named Calouste Gulbenkian (19:119; 51:29; 98:65-67). It was Gulbenkian who drew the famous Red Line around what he considered the former Ottoman Empire in a move to protect his oil interest in the Middle East. Figure 4 depicts the Red Line area. Sampson described the significance of the Red Line Agreement in The Seven Sisters.

Since no one was quite sure what was the former Ottoman Empire, Gulbenkian then and there drew a line on the map with a red pencil around the huge space which he meant, including all the great future oil producing areas of the Middle East except Iran and Kuwait. Thus came into being the most remarkable carve-up in oil history, known ever since as the Red Line Agreement. But no one, even including Gulbenkian, foresaw the full consequences of it [98:67].

When American companies participating in the negotiations queried the United States State Department if the Red Line was in consonance with American policy, the State Department responded affirmatively. Thus American companies were able to establish their first major interest in Middle East oil reserves (51:30).

American Oil Companies and Foreign Policy

Unlike the British government who directly purchased majority shares in the British Petroleum Company, the United States government only sanctioned actions on behalf of American oil companies in the Middle East. This was evidenced by American oil companies questioning the




Fig. 4. Red Line Agreement Area (98:68)

State Department as to the conformity of the Red Line clause with American policy. Also, while Britain's oilmen appeared to concentrate on serving Great Britain's empire, American oilmen were concerned with profits and avoiding antitrust suits.

The actions by American oil companies from 1922 to 1928 in response to the San Remo Agreement were subject to criticism. The State Department appeared to have relinquished the whole process of oil diplomacy to the oilmen. Sampson saw the government as preferring "to use the oil companies, at a discrete distance, as the instruments of national security and foreign policy [98:61]." But the fact was that by being directed abroad by the government in search of additional oil supplies, the oil companies became naturally involved with diplomacy. Thus, oil company relations with Washington became more intertwined (98:59). Exactly how much diplomacy the United States government was willing to allow the American oil companies to participate in became the intriguing question. In the post World War I period, an American foreign policy of isolationism relinquished much diplomacy to the oil companies.

Gulf, a participant in the Red Line Agreement, purchased the Bahrain concession from a London syndicate in the mid-1920s then sold their Bahrain concession to Socal in 1930. Socal was not one of the participants who

became entangled in Gulbenkian's Red Line Agreement several years prior. Bahrain's real importance was that it provided a stepping stone to Saudi Arabia. The formation of an all-American oil company in Saudi Arabia was "to change the whole Middle Eastern balance of power [98:90]." Socal united with Texaco in 1936 to share in the Saudi Arabian and Bahrain concessions. In 1939, as the King of Saudi Arabia turned the valve on the pipeline to begin the flow of oil, no American diplomatic representative was present. All the negotiations had been between the country of Saudi Arabia and an American oil company. (98:88-91).

During World War II, the need for United States government intervention in Middle East oil became obvious. In the early part of the war, German occupation extended into Africa. It was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, supported by Secretary of State Hull, who pushed for more extensive government control. In a move to safeguard oil reserves, Ickes advocated the formation of a government controlled oil corporation through the purchase of majority shares in the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Ickes saw other principle nations handling foreign oil business through companies partially owned or effectively controlled by governments themselves (51:47). Ickes also proposed the construction of a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean financed by

the United State government (51:39; 74:154-155).

Initially, the oil companies were willing to allow the government to act on both of Ickes' proposals. But, by mid-1943, when the German threat in the Middle East and North Africa was overcome, Texaco felt it no longer needed the government's support. Texaco withdrew all proposals and rejected all arrangements supporting the government's move to purchase shares in Aramco (98:97; 101:322-323). Furthermore, in the pipeline proposal, diplomatic implications arose and Great Britain feared American predominance. The oil industry also mobilized against Ickes and by 1945 Texaco and Socal organized the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company, known as Tapline (98:98-99). It was the planning of the Tapline route, however, that led to "more difficult diplomacy with the mounting tension between Arabs and Jews [98:99]."

It was in 1946 that the Saudi Arabian King's son, Amir Feisal, made a personal visit to Washington to meet with President Truman to discuss Zionism. Dean Acheson described the meeting as one in which Amir was concerned about the Near East while the President was concerned with the displaced European Jews (2:241). This example described the dichotomous foreign policy that would develop and exist in the Middle East from 1948 until the 1973 oil embargo. Sampson accurately described that policy in this way:

Two opposite American foreign policies were both firmly recognized; support for the State of Israel, which was critical for honour and votes, and support for Saudi Arabia, which was critical for oil. The State Department's solution was to delegate their diplomacy in the oil countries as far as possible to the [oil] companies, and to regard them as an autonomous kind of government; and through this means the two policies were kept remarkably separate for the next twenty-five years [98:100].

Leslie Gelb agreed with this assertion when he reported in the New York Times in 1974 that "The United States had made a substantial effort to separate the oil problem and its associated considerations from the Arab-Israeli issue [35:1]." McLaurin, Mughisuddin, and Wagner also agreed that the "two issues were largely and surprisingly discrete before 1973 [73:14]." These three authors also pointed out, however, a reason why these two policies had been separately pursued.

The reason that the two issues had not interacted more fully and consistently in the past is important to note here. While both centered on that region generally called the Middle East, they took place in two different parts of the area--the Arab-Israeli conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, and the petroleum production around the Persian Gulf. Thus, the immediate actors in each drama were different. Today, in both cases the roles--and therefore involvement--have proliferated so that there is a considerable cross-participation even on the two issues taken individually [73:14].

The Case of Iran

As the post war years showed an explosive growth in world petroleum consumption, the United States demanded more foreign oil along with other industrialized nations (51:49). Government intervention was also on the rise.

Even the Soviet Union reentered the western oil markets (51:150-171). It was in Iran that a fundamental move in the history of oil would occur.

As oil companies exploited oil in the Middle East nations, those nations soon realized that the oil revenues they were receiving were not increasing proportionally with oil company revenues as the value of oil increased. While the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company revenues increased tenfold from 1944 to 1950, Iran's profits rose only fourfold. Tension resulted between the producing nation and the oil company (50:228). Mohammed Mossadeq, a xenophobic, led a nationalistic movement in Iran from 1950 to 1953 that was to touch every aspect of Iranian culture, including oil. Nationalist elements in the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) succeeded in passing a motion prohibiting any negotiations with foreigners on oil concessions as long as foreign occupation existed in Iran (15:39; 64:191). It was in February, 1951, that Mossadeq proposed the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran (74:203; 98:118; 101:90-91). The dilemma for the British and British Petroleum was whether military intervention should be used to protect their oil investment.

Military might was not used but another means of pressure was employed. Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company,* Sir William Fraser, recognized the importance of oil to Iran. With government help, and the support of six major American oil companies, a boycott was enforced (42:283; 98:121). Secretary of State Dean Acheson encouraged the United States to refrain from sympathizing with the British. Support from American oil companies was needed but antitrust stirrings within the United States made the timing awkward. As pointed out in The Seven Sisters:

The conflict illustrated further basic dilemmas of oil policy: caught between the democratic principles of antitrust and the imperatives of foreign policy; between the long-term strategy of governments and the short-term tactics of companies; and between the widening differences of British and American attitudes to the Middle East [98:122].

But the United States also wanted the problem resolved as expeditiously as possible. Iran was calculating that the Americans would pressure the British to accept what was inevitable. The Iranians felt that the United States' fear of Russian expansion, a predominant issue in the United States during the early 1950s, and the importance of Iranian oil to NATO, would overrule British action. But the lack of a well thought-out policy for handling the crisis in Iran, and the rapid development of events in the crisis, left the United States in a difficult and uncomfortable position. In the end, the Americans were driven

*In 1938 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1954, the name was changed to British Petroleum.

to the British side due to the basic differences in which the British and Iranians handled the dilemma. The United States could understand the British method and approach to the problem while Iranian action "only exasperated the Americans [101:118-119]." Eventually the United States government requested that a group of American companies join with British, French, and Dutch companies in forming a consortium. Mossadeq had been ousted by Shah Pahlavi supporters, with the help of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, in the summer of 1953, and by October, 1954, the Iranian government reached an agreement with the oil consortium (18:13; 30:8). Oil production in Iran increased dramatically after the signing.

Thus, the situation in Iran led to the oil companies essentially "acting out" American foreign policy with government support. Again, the State Department was willing to allow the oil companies to look after oil problems while remaining apparently insensitive to the critical oil-foreign policy interrelationship.

The Creation and Role of OPEC

It was the increasing involvement of many independent oil companies during the 1950s that added a new dimension of competition to the existing competition among the seven major oil companies already operating in the Middle East. Increasing French, Japanese, Belgian, German, and even Spanish oil company involvement in the

Middle East further added impetus to the competition. In August, 1960, a major United States company, Exxon, announced an average ten cent cut per barrel of Middle East oil. The cut could drastically reduce revenues of the chief Middle East nations. Once the reduction began by Exxon, the other major oil companies followed suit. "The companies were solidly confronting the Middle East [98:158]."

Oil had been of vague importance to the Arabs in the early part of the 20th century, but when the Arab League was formed in 1945, oil was addressed as an issue. In studying about oil, Nasser recognized that petroleum was "one of the three chief components of Arab power" and "the vital nerve of civilization [98:159]." The Arab Petroleum Congress had been formed in recognition of oil as an important issue in world affairs. Individual differences and jealousy over leadership questions, however, kept the Arab nations from functioning effectively as a cohesive unit.

By the time the oil companies had recommended a second cut in price and began implementing the price cut, the Arab nations retaliated. The Arabs felt that consultation between the oil companies and the producing nations should have taken place. Shwadran described the situation in this way.

The companies maintained that to sell in the international market the Middle East oil they produced,

they must cut prices to meet competition; the exigencies of the market did not allow for previous consultation and negotiation. The major producing countries failed to see any justification for the price cuts and their reaction was soon forthcoming [101:506].

In Baghdad, in September of 1960, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait adopted two major resolutions. First, these countries confirmed that they could no longer be indifferent to pricing policies of the oil companies and that they intended to examine and develop a system of price stabilization. Second, these countries decided to establish an organization (OPEC) as a means of safeguarding their individual and joint interests (30:26; 101:506).

Initially the oil companies were not seriously concerned with OPEC (74:292-293). But John Jay McCloy, a respected lawyer and key figure in oil diplomacy, suggested to President Kennedy that joint OPEC action might possibly require relinquishing authority for collective bargaining to the oil companies. President Kennedy was interested in the issue and "for the sake of oil security of oil supplies and for reasons of foreign policy, the antitrust laws would be waived again [98:166]."

During its first decade of existence OPEC grew in this order: Qatar in 1961, Indonesia and Libya in 1962, Abu Dhabi in 1967, Algeria in 1969, Nigeria in 1971, and Ecuador in 1973. Jacoby pointed out that in 1973 OPEC oil

reserves constituted over 75 percent of the world's oil reserves and that 93 percent of crude oil exports to non-Communist nations were under OPEC's jurisdiction (51:113). While market prices declined during the 1960s, OPEC action helped crude oil posted prices to remain stable. OPEC also succeeded in accomplishing changes in the computation of the Arab producing nations revenue from oil. As a result of these combined accomplishments, supplemented by declining operating costs, average per barrel profits continued to rise. By 1970 OPEC had developed a strong bartering position and could demand sharp increases in oil revenues from the oil companies (30:2628).*

Saudi Arabia has long been the key to Middle East oil and OPEC action (58:114; 98:4, 301). It was the lack of Saudi commitment for the 1967 embargo that greatly hindered a successful boycott. Furthermore, it was also the Saudi support in the 1973 embargo that allowed OPEC to achieve a successful boycott (97:221). But it was Libya, not a Persian Gulf state but a North African nation, that was to have a significant affect on Middle East oil in 1970.

The Case of Libya

Prior to joining OPEC in 1962, Libya was the "Achilles heel of OPEC" as a result of its refusal to join

*For a concise description of some of the major conference actions, see Shwadrان's The Middle East, Oil, and The Great Powers, pp. 505-513.

the organization upon repeated invitations (74:322). Major independent oil companies' exploitation in Libya and enticements by these independents for Libya to remain out of OPEC through opening new private bank accounts in Switzerland for Libyan oil officials was the major reason for Libya's absence from OPEC. It was the arrogant claims of the independents to oppose any Libyan action to bring Libya's taxes on par with the Persian Gulf Arab oil producing nations that got the independents into trouble. Such arrogant claims destroyed the cost advantages the independent companies enjoyed in Libyan oil over Middle East oil when Libya joined OPEC in 1962 (74:327-328).

The lower cost, geographic advantage, and high quality of Libyan oil had caused the demand for Libyan oil to soar. Libya had been supplying almost 25 percent of Western Europe's oil by 1969. The government of Libya desired to speed up the search for additional oil to meet the increasing demand. Many independent oil companies responded to the call. This factor, the predominance of independents over the major oil companies in Libya, coupled with Libya's "aloofness from the cautious attitudes of the rest of OPEC [98:208]," put Libya in the limelight of world oil politics in 1970 (98:208).

The ouster of King Idris and his corrupt regime and takeover by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi threatened the oil companies' position in Libya in 1969. Qaddafi felt Libya was being cheated and demanded that the independents

increase oil prices. Shrewdly, Qadaffi approached the Soviet Union as a potential Libyan oil consumer and also began discussing oil prices with several major United States oil companies, Exxon and Occidental.* This latter action caused confusion and increased competition among the major and independent American oil companies. Exxon's refusal to pay more than five cents per barrel caused Qadaffi to respond by ordering Occidental to cut back production by 180,000 barrels per day (98:212). Occidental's chief executive took the initiative to meet with Exxon's chief executive but their inability to come to any agreement split the two parties. This lack of common ground inhibited a joint stance and was to have far-reaching implications. Armand Hammer, Occidental's chief executive, was put in a position of negotiating alone with Libya. In the end, Hammer negotiated a thirty cent increase per barrel and an increase of eight percent in the tax rate. The agreement had put not only Occidental but all oil companies in a position of "retreat or rout" as one Shell man exclaimed (98:213). Shortly thereafter Socal and Texaco also gave in to Libya and once these two major oil companies succumbed there was little chance of a "rout." Not only had Libya won, but soon the domino effect occurred throughout the Middle East oil producing countries (50:232;

*Occidental had already become the only major oil company to partake in the "Libyan oil bonanza" in the late 1950s (98:210).

51:259). The initial indications of a world oil shortage also appeared in 1970 and OPEC reported that 1970 was a turning point in the history of oil. A seller's market was replacing a buyer's market (98:215-216; 101:511; 58:107).

The 1973 Oil Embargo

The stage had been set. The United States government had created two separate foreign policies in the Middle East--one dictated by the oil companies with the Arab nations and the other dictated by the United States government over the Arab-Israeli issue. All the while, the United States was oblivious to what was really happening. A nationalistic spirit was spreading among the Arab nations (51:261). Although Iran had failed in its attempt under Mossadeq to nationalize Iranian oil in 1953, with the addition of OPEC in 1960 a gradual change was occurring. By 1970, Libya had effected a chain reaction throughout the Arab oil producing nations as oil policy became country dominated rather than oil company dominated. The Shah of Iran could now declare that "the oil companies had lost their old power [98:224]." Soon the oil companies would admit that the "Oil Kings" were the Arab producing countries and not the oil companies. The 1973 oil embargo marked that turning point.

Even though consuming nations were paying more for oil, imports continued to rise in the industrialized

nations. From 1967 to 1973, American oil imports rose by more than 150 percent. In 1973, American oil imports constituted 17 percent of the total energy supplies of the United States. When the Yom Kippur War began in October, 1973, OPEC cut production by 25 percent and also placed an embargo on exports to the United States (58:107-108). Furthermore, a 70 percent increase in the posted price of crude oil was also decreed. Then, in January, 1974, the price rose to a level four times greater than the October, 1973, posted price (51:263-264; 30:28).

There had been a gradual movement toward increasing oil prices by OPEC. Sampson pointed out that the drastic effect of the price increases was compounded by inflation and by oil shortages which had changed the whole bargaining position of OPEC and the whole psychological balance of power (98:250). It appeared that the price increases were a result of these types of factors while the United States oil boycott was more a result of the Yom Kippur War and the United States' foreign policy toward Israel. The oil minister of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Zaki Yamani, had warned the United States of its precarious position in supporting Israel. The United States had maintained the favor of the Saudis but America's dichotomous foreign policy in the Middle East was now placing the Saudis in an untenable position. Saudi Arabia had to choose between supporting OPEC or supporting the United

States. In the summer of 1973, President Nixon had taken a firm stance against Libya's threat to boycott oil because of Washington's support of Israel. Again he stood firm in face of the boycott as evidenced by his State of the Union address in January 1974. The Arab world was infuriated with President Nixon's remarks that Arab sources assured him of a halt to the embargo by February, 1974. Perhaps the fact the United States was receiving oil from the Arab countries despite the embargo gave President Nixon support to take a firm stand (105:14-15). The United States' action of calling a conference of major oil consuming nations in Washington in February, 1974, to counter the dangers of the embargo and OPEC further attacked the Arab position (102:73-74). The shift in the control of oil power from the oil companies to the Arab countries and the use of oil as a political weapon by the Arabs was stronger than the United States had realized or even assumed.

By the time the conference met in February, Secretary of State Kissinger was setting forth a seven-point approach to cooperation. The points included conservation, development of alternate energy sources, increased research and development, emergency sharing of oil supplies, international financial cooperation, aiding the lesser developed countries that were especially hurt by the energy crisis and increased consumer-producer relations (69:201-206). Furthermore, President Nixon proposed

a new energy policy which was designed to make the United States essentially self-sufficient in energy by 1980. The plan was called Project Independence and ultimately it would enhance national security (51:264; 70:210-213). The energy conference and Project Independence demonstrated that the United States was very concerned about Middle East oil and wanted to take action to cope with the oil crisis. But, to a degree, it was also an admission to the Arab oil countries that the United States recognized the reality of the boycott threat and the actual power that now belonged to the Arab nations. An energy crisis had emerged and the statistics clearly showed that the United States was dependent on the Arabs for oil. The quadrupling of oil prices had tremendous economic consequences on the whole international monetary system and balance of payments.* This fact also attested to the power that was now in the hands of the Arab oil producing nations.

The oil embargo directly impacted the American consumer and the public began voicing its opinion. Record profits were announced by the oil companies and the oil companies began extensive advertising to justify their profits. This only succeeded in increasing public outcry. It was not the Arabs who were being blamed for the problem

*See Gerald A. Pollack's, "The Economic Consequences of the Energy Crisis," in Foreign Affairs, Vol 52, No. 3, April 1974.

but the oil companies (98:266). Senator Frank Church led a Senate subcommittee investigation into the role of the multinational oil companies in the Middle East. Anthony Sampson described the result of the hearings.

The story slowly emerged, from the mountains of memos and testimony It was a more intricate and fascinating tale of the interplay of government and companies, with a gaping void of abdication and evasion in the middle. It became clear that the State Department, after helping to safeguard Aramco and the Iranian Consortium in the fifties, had virtually delegated its responsibility for oil supplies: partly deliberately, because of the embarrassment of the Israeli question; partly through apathy, for the oil seemed to be flowing so freely, and the companies claimed to be able to look after the problem by themselves. As George Piercy of Exxon explained: "The fact is that up until 1970-71, there was little need for the Government's active involvement or intervention" . . . [98:274].

On April 15, 1976, Forbes contained an article entitled, "Don't Blame the Oil Companies: Blame the State Department." Forbes' sources of information included hearings on the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, personal interviews with leading figures and published statements by the former head of the Office of Fuels and Energy (22:69). But perhaps more important than blame was the fact that by studying the history of oil in this century alone, United States policy makers might have foreseen increasing dependency on Middle East oil and recognized the need for the United States to deal more directly with the Arab nations sooner. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology Energy Laboratory Policy Study Group made an economic evaluation of Project

Independence's goal of energy self-sufficiency by 1980. Five critical uncertainties were identified and these uncertainties made the self-sufficiency forecast extremely difficult to make. These uncertainties included: (1) the responsiveness of domestic supply and demand to price changes, (2) the world oil price, (3) the cost of synthetic fuels, (4) expansion capacity of the fuel construction industry, and (5) the nature of security. "Uncertainties in these five areas make it extremely difficult to analyze any policy favoring self-sufficiency in energy," the Study Group concluded (70:1-6).

Today the unexploited reserves of Mexico, estimated to be very significant, could prove to be another major event in history which deserves careful and thorough investigation. President Carter's newest energy plan of lifting oil price controls could also be a critical step. Recognizing the oil companies' strength, President Carter said:

Surely as the sun will rise the oil companies can be expected to fight to keep their profits--which they have not earned. Unless you speak out, they will have more influence on Congress than you do [36:1].

Summary

Oil has had a significant impact on United States foreign policy in the Middle East, especially since 1973. Prior to 1973, major American oil companies played the major role in carrying out United States foreign policy

with the Arab states. As America became more dependent on Arab oil, the United States government was forced to devote more attention to Arab demands. The Arabs had used oil as a political weapon against the United States during the 1973 Yom Kippur War because of America's support of Israel. Also, the quadruple price increase in oil in 1973 intensified the energy crisis. Developments such as these had moved the United States' Middle East policy "away from near total support of Israel [39:164]." The world wide economic repercussions of the 1973 oil embargo and quadruple price increase were significant but ultimately one should remember that "the thing to understand about the oil business is that it is more political than an economic activity [75:7]."

Middle East oil has played an important role in the international arena and will probably continue to do so in the future. Like the United States, the Soviet Union has interests in Middle East oil, but for different reasons. The next chapter examines the Soviet threat in the Middle East not only from the perspective of the oil issue, but from other important perspectives as well.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOVIET THREAT

Introduction

Today, the United States is saturated with news releases concerning events in the Middle East. It is difficult to read a newspaper or magazine without crossing an article devoted to either Middle East current events or the impact of the Middle East on the United States. The volume of news media coverage gives credence to what many Americans know as and Edwin Wright expressed as the most critical area of the world (120; 121). As is readily apparent from earlier chapters, the Middle East has always been important in history, religion, and since World War I, in international politics. The oil crisis has intensified that importance. For the United States, the oil crisis is related to a problem of earlier origin. That is, the threat of Soviet intrusions into the Middle East.

The Soviet threat to the Middle East is not a recent development as is the oil dilemma. The United States-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East has been recognized since World War II. In 1954, Halford L. Haskins in his book The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics expressed free world fears of Soviet

intervention into the Middle East (45). Even after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, many believed that the Middle East was only important because of Soviet intrusions. Walter Laqueur, writing under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote in June, 1969, that the importance of the Middle East to U. S. Foreign policy was not in its oil resources or the Arab-Israeli conflict, but in the Soviet threat (62:3-4). Like many in the 1960s and early 1970s, he did not foresee oil as an international weapon. He pictured the Middle East as important only for the United States-Soviet confrontation. He wrote:

The Middle East is not intrinsically one of the most important areas in world affairs. It has long ceased to be a cross roads, its military bases are not longer needed, it has no important natural resources other than oil, but there is no lack of oil elsewhere in the world. And yet, in view of the delicate balance of global power, the Soviet Union attributes great importance to the Middle East, and its presence there may have far-reaching political effects in Europe as well as Africa and Asia [62:3-4].

He correctly foresaw the importance that Soviet intervention would play. However, he failed to see that the Soviets were interested in the Middle East not only for the expansion of Soviet ideology and territory, but because the Soviets foresaw the growing energy dependence of the free world upon the Middle East. The point to be made is that the Soviet threat to the Middle East did not arise with the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 or the Arab oil

embargo of 1973. The Soviet threat has been around a long time. In fact, as Senator James L. Buckley pointed out, Russia had ambitions to "hold domination from Istanbul to Jerusalem to the Persian Gulf [8:206]." This ambition goes back centuries (8:206; 57:27-37; 61:1-5). Since the oil embargo of 1973, however, the United States-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East has become "the most dangerous single threat to world peace [8:204]." This chapter traces the Soviet threat to the Middle East from a brief history of Russian involvement to current Soviet involvement. The chapter concentrates on the strategic, economic, and political aspects of the Soviet threat.

History of Russian Involvement

Before a discussion of a history of Russian or Soviet involvement in the Middle East can be conducted, it is necessary to define what is meant by the terms Russian and Soviet. The term Russian is commonly used to describe the people who lived in what is today the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the third century and under tsarist rule from the seventeenth century until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The term Soviet refers to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) following the Bolshevik Revolution. Therefore, the Bolshevik Revolution caused Russians to become Soviets. This change was not in name alone, but also in political ideology (116).

Russian involvement in the Middle East has a long tradition in history. It can be traced as far back as the Mongol period, and even into the era of the Byzantine Empire. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Mongols extended their empire as far west as Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria and south into Persia and the Middle East. A Mongol objective, other than control of the known world, was the use of the great trade routes connecting the Pacific with the Mediterranean. Because the southern and eastern portions of Russia were under Mongol rule, Russian commerce became linked to the Mediterranean and Middle East through the trade routes within the Mongol Empire (116:57-84). When Ivan III of Russia declared independence from the Mongols in 1480, Russia lost its use of the trade routes through the Middle East to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. This left Russia a landlocked country. Although Russia had a sea outlet through the Baltic, this outlet was only useable for a few months each year due to ice blockage. Russia also had a sea outlet to the Pacific, but this outlet could only be reached by pushing across the vastness of Central Asia. This was a distance covering several thousands of miles. Therefore, Russia considered itself landlocked and in need of a sea outlet to further its aims as a political and national entity (57:27-28). This fact was realized by Peter the Great, and he strove for Russia to gain access

to sea outlets by pressing south to the Middle East. From Peter the Great on, Russia and later the Soviets have struggled to achieve and maintain sea outlets to the south (57:27; 61:3; 63:1-10; 72:116-117). This desire for the "utilization of the navy to fulfill a perceived national destiny became part of the tsarist legacy inherited by the Bolsheviki [57:27]."

Since Peter the Great's desire for southern seaports in 1725, Russian history is full of wars fought for that objective. In 1768, Catherine the Great began pressuring Turkey for Russian rights to a seaport open to the Mediterranean, and in 1770 succeeded (57:27; 61:3). Since that time until the Bolshevik Revolution in the twentieth century, Russia fought some fourteen wars against the Ottoman Empire (120). With the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 came the end of tsarist territorial acquisitions for sea access to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The emergence of the Soviets, however, did not stop the yearning for southern expansion, but only temporarily postponed it until World War II (57:33; 61:5; 71:13). Even though the Russian tsars are gone and a Soviet regime is in power, the same condition of a landlocked USSR is valid today. The push for sea outlets through the Middle East for both trade and military purposes is still a driving force in Soviet ambitions today.

Origins of Soviet Involvement

From 1917 to World War II, Soviet involvement in the Middle East was at a minimum. The Soviet regime was more concerned about its own survival than expansionism. This period was spent solidifying the internal political factions within the USSR. The Soviets needed a period of internal stabilization if they were to become a European power and eventually a world power. This was a necessary part of their ideological design. Their only significant relations with the Middle East were with Turkey and Iran, and these were more for security reasons than for expansionistic ambitions. The Soviets viewed the British as the primary opposition to their ideology. The British were active in both Turkey and Iran following World War I, and Soviet policy in this direction was aimed against British influence, particularly in Iran. In fact, a Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed in 1921 permitting Soviet troops on Iranian soil if the USSR was threatened from the South (61:36). Soviet policy during this time was purely for internal security (61:31; 63:6-9; 72:116-118).

Although the Soviets did not take an active expansionist policy toward the Middle East until after World War II, they did have ambitions for influence within the area. These ambitions were revealed as existing as early as 1940. After World War II, documents were found that showed secret Nazi-Soviet relations. These secret

documents were the draft of a Four-Power Pact agreement of November 13, 1940, which spelled out spheres of influence for Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. According to this pact, Germany's sphere of influence was to be in Europe and Central Africa, Italy's in northern and north-eastern Africa, Japan's in south-eastern Asia, and the Soviet Union was to have a sphere of influence south of the Soviet Union's borders in the direction of the Indian Ocean. A clarification of the Soviet's sphere of influence was given by Molotov to the German ambassador in Moscow as "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union [61:34]." This pact was voided by the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941, but the intentions of the Soviets toward the Middle East were known to the Axis Powers and eventually to the rest of the world (45:13; 61:34-36). These Soviet aspirations for Middle East influence were founded upon a Soviet defense to the south, the need for sea outlets to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and the oil deposits of the Middle East being a desirable resource to control.

Following World War II, the Soviet's Middle East aspirations turned mainly toward their immediate southern neighbors of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Of these three, only Iran possessed rich oil deposits. The Soviets had stationed troops in northern Iran during World War II

using their agreement of 1921 with Iran to protect their southern border. After the war, however, the Soviets failed to withdraw. They had imperialistic ambitions in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan which included Soviet oil rights. What made the Soviets finally withdraw from Iran was the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the United States pressure that followed (45:15-16; 61:34-42). After the Soviet withdrawal from Iran, the Soviets played a low key role in the Middle East. They did, however, support the partition of Palestine in 1947 and recognized Israel in 1948. In fact, the Soviets even sold arms to Israel in 1948 and 1949. These arms sales were a significant factor in the Israeli triumph. All in all though, the Soviets conducted a wait and see policy until the mid-1950s. The side line policy of the USSR during this period undoubtedly helped the Soviets when in 1955 they greatly expanded their Middle East involvement (94:417-418).

The USSR's 1955 entry into Middle East politics "was based on the growing might of the USSR and reflected Khrushchev's determination to compete with the United States on a global scale [104:259]." The main target of the Soviets new Middle East initiatives was Egypt. In 1955, the Soviets made an arms agreement with Egypt and supplied the Egyptians with a powerful arsenal. With the Israeli-Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956, the Soviets were provided with a golden opportunity to gain a

strong foothold in the Middle East. Since then, the Soviets have become the champions of the Arab world against Israel and Israel's staunch ally, the United States (94:418). Only recently has the United States effectively been able to loosen the Soviet's hold on the Arab nations. Since 1956, the Soviets have exerted powerful influence in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, and areas of Africa bordering the Middle East (91:31-45; 94:418; 104:260-284). The remainder of this chapter is devoted to looking at the Soviet threat in the Middle East in terms of the strategic, economic, and political implications of Soviet involvement.

The Strategic Threat

The strategic position of the Middle East is what gives the area its greatest importance in today's military considerations. Its geographical position and oil reserves is what makes the area so important to the survival of the free world. The Middle East, however, is not only strategically important for the survival of the free world, but also has strategic importance in the defense of the USSR. It is this strategic importance of the Middle East that gives the major impetus to both the United States and Soviet involvement (72:119-120; 104:259-262).

The USSR is still basically a landlocked power just as it was under tsarist rule. The Baltic outlets

still offer limited use due to ice blockage, and the Pacific seaports are of limited value as the distance to these ports is several thousands of miles from eastern USSR and Soviet industry. These Pacific ports are also a considerable distance from where the Soviets would like to use their naval forces (57:27-28). Having a sea outlet into the Mediterranean does not greatly enhance Soviet naval capability. The Soviet navy could be bottled up in the Mediterranean without much difficulty. The only exits from the Mediterranean are either through the straits of Gibraltar, which is a narrow passage controlled by the British, or through the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal can be easily blocked as was seen in 1967 during an Arab-Israeli war. Other exits to the Indian Ocean could only be made if the Soviets had sea outlets in the Persian Gulf. The USSR depends more upon the Middle East's waterways for military capability than does the United States. In time of war these waterway exits for the Soviet fleet could be easily blocked (45:18-77; 104:263). The exit out of the Persian Gulf is through the Strait of Hormuz whose width only offers four miles of safe passage (121).

What makes the Soviets desire a naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean is their fear of a nuclear attack from submarines in these waters (72:119-120; 104:273-275). The Soviet Union has very little defense against this type of attack launched from these waters.

This threat became paramount in 1964 when the United States first deployed the Polaris A-3 into the area (72:119-120). The Soviet Union voiced its concern over this threat and emphasized the strategic value of the Indian Ocean.

The programs of militarization of the Indian Ocean is directed above all against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Since the Polaris A-2 and A-3 missiles with which the U.S. submarines are now armed have an operational range from 3,000 to 4,500 kilometers, they represent a definite threat to the security of many states, including the Soviet Union, regardless of what ocean these submarines are in. At the same time one has to bear in mind that the profusion of small and little-inhabited islands in the Indian Ocean creates favorable opportunities for the location of a network of bases. In terms of distance, to the Soviet Union's southern borders from the Indian Ocean is only 1,200 kilometers, which means that a large part of Soviet territory is within the range of the Polaris missiles.

Quite clearly, these considerations strongly attract U.S. strategists to the Indian Ocean; they look on it as a convenient launching area for submarine-carried strategic missiles. With the replacement of the Polaris by the Poseidons, whose range is up to 5,000-6,000 kilometers, the strategic value of the Indian Ocean from this point of view will be even greater [Quoted in 72:120].

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean for submarine-launched nuclear missiles was given a renewed awakening when the United States launched a new and larger class of nuclear submarine, the Trident, on April 7, 1979. This new class of submarine can carry 24 missiles that are capable of leveling 408 targets with nuclear blasts five times as great as the nuclear weapon dropped in World War II (112:A-11). As can be seen, the

Soviets view the Middle East as strategic to their defense.

Ironically, the same waterways that pose a threat to the Soviet Union pose an even greater threat to the United States and the free world. In this case, the free world is threatened by the cutoff of its oil supply from the Middle East. Unlike the USSR, Western Europe and Japan are heavily dependent upon Middle East oil for the running of their industries and national economies. Even the United States imports about 40 percent of its oil consumption, of which Middle East oil makes up a significant portion. President Carter said on a nationally televised speech on April 5, 1979, that oil imports to the United States may soon reach 50 percent of consumption. The fact of the matter is that the free world must have Middle East oil to survive. United States Energy Secretary Schlesinger told a Congressional committee in early 1979 that the denial of Middle East oil would destroy the free world as we know it today (121). Japan is almost totally dependent upon Middle East oil and Western Europe is heavily dependent (6:79-101). The threat of a Middle East oil stoppage to the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has hurt relations within that organization (66: 490-497). As a result of a threat of Middle East oil stoppage to members of NATO by the Arab nations, the United States was denied landing rights in all NATO

countries, except Portugal, in its efforts to supply Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War (8:208-209).

The free world's reliance upon Middle East oil is not new. Halford L. Hoskins noted that in the early 1950s more than half of the world's tanker fleet was being used to transport oil from the Persian Gulf to Western countries (45:224). In 1974, 4,470 oil tankers carried some 2.9 billion barrels of crude oil and products from Aramco's Persian Gulf terminals (79:267). This does not include oil loaded at other ports within the Persian Gulf. All of these tankers must pass through the Strait of Hormuz. As noted earlier, this passage has only four miles of useable waterway. It would be an easy matter for the Soviets to block this passage and deny oil to the free world. With the fall of the Shah of Iran and the current anti-American views of the present Iranian government, the prospect of the closing of this passage is even more threatening. The Soviet Union has recognized the dependency of the free world on Middle East oil and the vulnerability of the Middle East oil routes.

The Soviets have made intrusions into the Middle East that have secured for themselves strategic advantages to help deter oil shipments. Even if the Strait of Hormuz could remain open, the Soviets have entrenched themselves in the Horn of Africa. They are present in strategically located South Yemen and Somalia. From these positions,

they could deny the free world the use of the Suez Canal and make the oil tankers take the much longer route around Africa. The Soviet naval presence has also grown in the Indian Ocean, and from naval bases in both South Yemen and Somalia, the Soviet Union could militarily disrupt oil transportation in the Indian Ocean (104:259-284). Secretary of the Air Force John C. Stetson voiced free world fears of the Soviet strategic threat in 1977:

For many years, the Soviets have been totally self-sufficient in oil. They even have been able to export significant amounts to other nations of the Warsaw Pact. But that situation is changing . . . Before the end of the next decade, the Soviet Union itself will be forced to look outside its borders, if it is to meet its growing oil needs in any economically feasible way . . . The prospect of obtaining low-cost Persian crude oil by threat or by military force, and then denying it to the free world, certainly has occurred to them . . . [Quoted in 41:75].

Halford L. Hoskins described the ease with which the Soviet Union could seize or destroy Middle East oil fields and the difficulty the free world would have in defending or retaking these fields:

In the event of Soviet military adventure into the Middle East and the opening of unbridled War, it is by no means certain that the oil resources of the area could be protected. They lie at considerable distance from major Allied power concentrations. They cannot surely be defended from the air alone. Even if the proximate sea lanes should remain in Allied hands, virtually all of the main oil fields and refineries lie within bombing range of the potential enemy, if not also within reach of his ground forces. Except for Turkey, none of the Middle East states could offer more than token resistance, even were it disposed to resist at all, and Allied ground forces, if coming late upon the scene, would be at a very serious disadvantage [45:230].

There is a real strategic Soviet threat to the Middle East. The Soviets could stop the oil supply that is vital to the free world. What the odds are of this actually happening are beyond the scope of this thesis, but the fact that the Soviets have the capability of stopping Middle East oil flow makes the threat critical to the free world. This threat must be countered by the United States and the rest of the free world.

The Economic Threat

The Soviets would like to be an economic threat to the free world in the Middle East, but at present do not have the resources required to compete with the free world (61; 94:420; 104:262-263). This is not to say that the Soviets could not become an economic threat in the future. It is an area where the Soviets may in the future rival the free world.

Currently, the oil nations of the Middle East are dependent upon the free world for the exploration, procurement, transportation, and marketing of their oil (61). If the Soviet Union is to rival the free world in the Middle East in economic terms, it must be able to replace the free world as the oil agent for the Middle East. That is, the Soviet Union must be a viable alternative to the free world, especially the United States, in the logistics of oil and oil sales if they are to gain a major economic hold on the Middle East. At the present

time, the Soviet Union cannot replace the economic role of the free world in the Middle East with regards to oil (61; 72:122-124; 104:262-263).

The Soviets presently are self-sufficient in oil production, and they plan to remain self-sufficient in energy production. This

Is supported by Brezhnev's efforts to secure large-scale Western capital investments to develop Soviet oil and natural gas reserves and by the Kremlin's recent far-reaching decision to increase sharply domestic production and consumption of abundant coal [104:262].

The Soviets have somewhat of an oil dilemma. Even though they have vast oil reserves, they may eventually become a net importer of petroleum. If so, they would need Middle East oil. This would be caused by geography, logistics, and shortages of investment capital and equipment within the USSR. At present, the Soviet oil production and distribution system is highly inefficient compared to Western standards. For these same reasons, the Soviets could not, at least in the near future, replace the Middle East reliance upon the free world for oil production, transportation, and sales. The Soviets lack immediate capital in both money and equipment to replace the free world as the Middle East's oil agent. As already mentioned, they are seeking Western capital equipment for their own oil production. The Soviets also do not have the logistics necessary to transport Middle East oil throughout the world or access to world oil markets. This is something

that the Soviets would like to achieve and may eventually be able to do (66:493-494; 72:122-124; 104:262-263). It is an area that the free world should watch closely and protect against Soviet initiatives. The remaining area of Soviet threat in the Middle East is the political threat.

The Political Threat

The Soviets present a grave political threat in the Middle East to the United States and its free world allies. Since 1956, the Soviets have been the champion of the Arab cause in its struggle against the state of Israel. The Soviets have been able to obscure the fact that they were one of the first to recognize Israel as a political entity and had sold arms to Israel. Since the mid-1950s, the Soviets have aligned themselves with the Palestinian cause and have sold arms to many Arab countries, including supersonic bombers to Iraq (72:128). Recently, however, the Soviets have had to face a contradiction in their support for the Arab cause. The Soviets have been allowing Jewish immigration from the USSR into Israel. In March of 1979, the Soviets allowed more Jews to emigrate from the USSR than in any other month in history. In March, 1979, 4,418 Jews emigrated, and there is speculation that almost 50,000 Jews may be able to leave the USSR in 1979. Many of these Jews will go to Israel (107:6).

The Soviets have succeeded in political influence in the Middle East. The Soviet ideology, however, is contrary to what the Arabs believe.

So far as the Arab reaction to Communism is concerned, the bulk of the Arab masses have remained hostile to Communist ideology, which they perceived to be antithetical to their religious, economic, and political values [71:141].

The Middle East affords no centrally controlled, ideologically based political framework of parties responsive to Moscow, such as would be important to support a program of direct, political penetration. There is an indigenous, unifying strength inherent in both the Muslim religion and Arabism, which tends to resist subjugation to such alien ideologies as Communism. The region divisiveness through deeply seated rivalries and hostilities would also seem, in the long term, to imperil any foreign-imposed political hegemony [61:80-81].

How then has the Soviet Union succeeded politically in the Middle East?

The Soviet Union understands that its ideology is contrary to most Arab values, for the only truly outright success of communist ideology has been in South Yemen. It recognizes this fact and uses techniques other than just political ideology to gain influence (75:163). The primary source for Soviet influence has been the Arab-Israeli conflict (61:104). The United States has found itself with conflicting goals in the Middle East. The United States has committed itself to the survival of Israel and at the same time has tried to remain a staunch ally of the Arab nations. This position leaves the United States vulnerable to Soviet influence in the Arab world. The United States in its support of Israel has, at times,

antagonized the Arab nations. When this happens, the Soviet Union is quick to capitalize on the situation. It tries to keep a state of political resentment toward the United States among the Arab world, and has done so with some effectiveness (61:104). The Soviet Union, although not gaining ground through professing its ideology in the Arab World, has countered United States foreign policy in the Middle East by fostering anti-Americanism whenever the situation has presented itself. It will continue to do so whenever the United States places itself in a conflicting role (104).

Iran is an example of where the Soviets have contributed to political unrest within the area and shows how the Soviets have tried to undermine United States influence where they have felt they could. Although the recent overthrow of the Shah of Iran cannot be blamed solely as a result of Soviet influence, the Soviets had some effect on the Iranian people.

Although Radio Moscow did not succeed in converting many Iranians and Arabs to communist ideology, it did prove to be an important vehicle in raising the consciousness of the masses about their economic misery and possibilities of alleviating poverty through a socialist system [71:140].

Soviet publications also did their part in creating unrest in Iran. The World Marxist Review published the following statement on Iran:

In this country which is one vast prison the prevailing atmosphere is that of fear, suspicion, and mistrust. Political organizations of both the working

class and the national bourgeoisie have been smashed and their leaders jailed. Not a single legal newspaper or journal of the opposition appears; deputies instead of being elected are appointed by the Shah [Quoted in 61:55].

As long as the United States faces political contradictions in the Middle East such as supporting Israel and arming the Arab nations, the Soviets are a threat through their political influence and political subversive activities. With the United States and its allies being so dependent upon the Middle East, any Soviet political success can have an adverse effect upon the free world (62:63-117; 66:490-495; 73:120-122).

The Soviets have also used their supply of arms to the Arabs to gain political influence. Previous United States refusal to sell arms to the Arabs because of its support for Israel was the major factor in the expansion of Soviet Union influence in this area. Thus, the Soviets have exerted strong political influence in the Middle East countries of Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Lebanon, and, until recently, Egypt. Egypt is still somewhat reliant upon the Soviet Union in that the great bulk of its arms are Soviet made. President Sadat of Egypt estimated it would take twenty years to replace all of the Soviet arms in Egypt (91:37).

How has the United States tried to counter Soviet political influence in the Middle East? The United States does not have the political ideological problem that the

Soviet Union faces in the Middle East. Although Arab ideology does not exactly coincide with the capitalistic philosophy, there are many beliefs that are jointly held. Most Arab nations have chosen the American way over what the Soviets have to offer in terms of ideology. This has been borne out through history and is evidenced by Saudi Arabia's fear of communism and Egypt's expulsion of the Soviets in 1972 (61:91; 104). The United States' primary tool of countering Soviet political influence, however, is not with capitalist ideology but through arms sales or transfers. The United States has seen that its past policy of not allowing arms to the Arab countries has hurt politically. The United States has recognized this fact. President Carter stated in March, 1978:

I think it's very good for nations to turn to us for their security needs, instead of having to turn to the Soviet Union as they have in the past. I am talking specifically about Egypt. . . . To maintain security in that region is important. Egypt has other threats against its security. The Soviets are shipping massive quantities of weapons into the Middle Eastern area now, into the Red Sea area--Ethiopia, into Syria, Iraq, Libya--and we cannot abandon our own friends. So I don't think it is wrong at all to insure stability or the right to defend themselves in a region with arms sales [Quoted in 77:19-20].

United States arms sales to Middle Eastern countries have been enormous as was previous cited in Chapter I of this thesis. Unseemingly, the Arab oil boycott of 1973 and the resulting increases in the price of oil that followed has helped the Arab countries buy United States arms which, in turn, helps to deter the Soviet

Union. Prior to 1973, United States arms deliveries to the Middle East were principally made through grant aid. That is, the American taxpayer paid for most of the arms sent to that area. Since 1973, the Arabs have been able to pay for these arms through revenues generated from oil sales. The Arab countries have spent billions of dollars on United States arms following the oil boycott (21:1). These recent increases in Middle East oil prices have enabled the Arab countries to buy more United States arms than they probably would have been given through grant aid programs. This, in turn, has helped the United States counter the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Thus, the United States has been able to gain some political leverage against the Soviets in the Middle East through arms sales paid for as a result of increased Middle East oil revenues.

Summary

The Middle East is vital to the security of the United States and its free world allies. The Soviets recognize this fact and have tried to exert pressure upon the freeworld through the Middle East. Soviet objectives in the Middle East are primarily strategic and political, not economic. In the future, however, the Soviets may become an economic force in the Middle East. Alvin Rubinstein accurately summarized Soviet objectives in the Middle East when he wrote:

Moscow seeks (1) to undermine Western influence; (2) to expand Soviet influence through exploitation of Arab-Western and Arab-Israeli tensions; (3) to acquire a foothold in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf; (4) to disrupt Arab-Western oil relations, with a view toward weakening Western Europe; and (5) to have a commanding voice in the management of Middle Eastern settlements, as befits the status of a superpower [94:420].

United States foreign policy must recognize the significance of Soviet involvement in the Middle East and counter it with effective measures. The current Middle East situation is very unstable and may be manipulated by the Soviets to severely threaten free world survival.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The birth of Israel was not a spontaneous outgrowth of the events of 1948. The creation of Israel had its roots from events in ancient history. The most basic of these events was the covenant that God made with Abraham, the Father of the Jews. The Jews believe that the land of Israel was God's gift to the Jewish people in return for their recognition of His existence as the one, true God. This event is the driving force behind the Jewish claim to the land and emphasizes the importance of religion in modern Israel. The creation of Israel was given its next greatest impetus by the Zionist movement of the nineteenth century. This movement stressed the need to return to Israel without waiting for the Messiah's return. This movement was furthered by the British Balfour Declaration in 1917. This Declaration was the first political acknowledgement of the Jewish right to a homeland in Palestine. With the rise of Hitler to power in Europe and his persecution of the Jews, the Zionist movement acquired the Jewish immigrants needed to start a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Restrictive immigration policies in the United States and Western European

countries aided in the movement of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Arabs had lived in Palestine for centuries and fought against the Zionist movement throughout the twentieth century. As the Jewish population of Palestine increased because of mass immigration, the conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews intensified. The Jews declared their God-given right to the land and the Arabs based their right to the land on 2,000 years of territorial occupation. After World War II, the United Nations actively sought a peaceful solution to the Palestinian conflict, but a permanent solution was never realized. The Arab-Jew confrontation came to a peak in 1948 with an armed Jewish rebellion and the current political state of Israel was established. Both the United States and the Soviet Union immediately recognized the state of Israel. Although the Arab-Israeli conflict appears to be a political confrontation, it also contains deeply embedded religious issues. The Jews believe that God gave the land to them, and them alone. The Arabs adhere to the religion of Islam. Followers of Islam believe that their religion is superior to Judaism. Both religions claim to worship the same God; however, the Muslims believe that they have God's most recent revelation which was given to Mohammad. This revelation was given because Jews and Christians were not following God's word. Islam, then, is a redirection that Jews and Christians should follow. The concept

of a Jewish state is against the philosophy of Islam. Since Arab nations in the Middle East are strict followers of Islam, religion plays a significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

With the creation of Israel in 1948, wars of conflict resulted. As the Israelis gained additional territories, Arabs were displaced from their Palestinian homeland and a serious Arab refugee problem emerged. These refugees received little financial assistance from either Jews or Arabs. Arab nations were unwilling to allow any large numbers of refugees to settle inside their borders for two major reasons. First, Arab states feared it would be difficult for refugees to return to their original homes in Palestine once they settled in other Arab states. Thus, the Arabs felt they would have been conceding defeat of a possibility for a Palestinian return. Second, supporting Palestinian refugees placed an economic burden on the limited economies of neighboring Arab states. Arab refugees eventually turned their situation into a major political issue. The issue has become so significant that Arab nations, except Egypt, have refused to negotiate a permanent peace with Israel until a solution to the Palestinian problem is achieved. The Palestinian resistance movement, a result of the Arab refugee problem, further complicates achieving a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The land occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Day War has been another issue hindering peace efforts in the Middle East. The Arab policy is that land taken during the 1967 War should be returned in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. The Israelis, however, view these territories as essential for their defense. The territories provide added protection for Israel. The Israelis are not completely opposed to returning the land if agreements adequately insure Israel's security. However, the West Bank, which includes Jerusalem, poses a significant problem other than security. The religious significance of Jerusalem to the Israeli's is a key factor preventing its return. Many of the Jew's religious sites, including the "Wailing Wall," are located in the occupied portion of Jerusalem. The Israelis also want Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel. Thus, the West Bank and Jerusalem pose a unique problem in the return of captured territories.

Prior to 1973, the United States pursued dichotomous foreign policies in the Middle East. The American government involved itself in foreign affairs with Israel and the major oil companies interacted with the Arab nations in the conduct of foreign policy. Support of Israel had existed since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Prior to this period, political interaction between the United States and Arab governments was

practically nonexistent. The major role in carrying out American foreign policy had been delegated to the oil companies. With the exceptions of the 1933 Depression and World War II, the government seldom became involved in oil issues in the Middle East. The United States policy of supporting Zionism and its policy of achieving its interests in oil became more and more difficult in the 1960s. The United States failed to see or react to awakening Arab nationalism during the 1960s. Furthermore, the major American oil companies had capitalized on oil profits at the expense of the Arab producing nations. The oil companies saw unified Arab action looming on the horizon but failed to perceive it as the powerful force that it ultimately became.

The formation of OPEC was largely the result of two factors: (1) the desire of oil producing nations to halt the exploitation of Middle East oil by the major oil companies, and (2) rising Arab nationalism. As the Arab-Israeli conflict intensified, Arab nationalism also intensified. The creation of OPEC forced the United States government to begin listening more carefully to the Arabs' position. However, America still continued to deal dichotomously with Israel and the Arabs as if both of her interests--oil and support for Israel--could be achieved simultaneously.

The 1973 oil embargo had a significant affect on United States foreign policy in the Middle East. As America's dependency on imported Middle East oil increased, the Arabs discovered that oil could be used as a political weapon. When Saudi Arabia sided with OPEC in effecting an oil boycott against the United States, America felt the political pressure that oil could exert. The Arabs demanded that the United States assume a "more balanced policy" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. These demands have been successful in that the United States has publicly announced the need for a Palestinian homeland and has more actively participated in the peace process since 1973. During these peace negotiations, the United States has been much more sensitive and responsive to the Arabs' requirements for a peace settlement.

The Middle East is strategically important to both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union is basically a landlocked nation due to a lack of warm water seaports near its industrial centers. Because of this, the Soviet Union has strived for seaports in the Middle East in order to enhance both its commerical and military capability. The Soviet Union also views the Middle East as strategically important for their national defense. The Soviets are virtually defenseless from a nuclear attack launched by submarines located in both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. This has led to

an increased Soviet naval presence in the waters surrounding the Middle East and the establishment of Soviet naval bases in South Yemen and Somalia. Currently, the Soviet Union is self-sufficient in oil, but eventually it may need to import sizeable amounts of oil from the Middle East because of its inefficiency in oil production. When this happens, the Middle East will become even more important to the Soviet Union. Like the Soviet Union, the United States views the Middle East as strategically important. The United States and its allies, especially Western Europe and Japan, are dependent upon Middle East oil for the continued prosperity of their economies. Without Middle East oil, the economies of Western Europe and Japan would be severely affected, perhaps virtually destroyed. The United States is also becoming increasingly dependent upon Middle East oil. The shipment of oil from the Middle East to the United States and its allies depends upon a few very narrow shipping lanes that exit the Middle East. These shipping lanes could easily be closed and the resulting stoppage of oil would have disastrous effects on the free world. For this reason, the Middle East is strategically important to the United States.

The Soviet Union has been able to gain political influence in the Middle East through exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and arms deliveries to several Arab

nations. The Soviet Union recognizes that its communist ideology has little chance of success in the Arab world. To make up for its ideological inadequacy, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the conflicting position that the United States has pursued in the Middle East; that is, its commitment to the survival of Israel and its attempt to be an ally of the Arab nations. Whenever the United States antagonizes the Arabs by its support of Israel, the Soviet Union becomes the catalyst that keeps anti-American resentment within the Arab nations a current issue. The Soviet Union has also gained political influence in the Middle East through their arms deliveries to some Arab countries. Some of the Arab countries where the Soviet Union has been successful with arms deliveries are Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, and formerly Egypt.

The primary strategy of the United States to counter Soviet intrusion into the Middle East has been arms sales and transfers. The United States has realized that its past policy of not allowing arms sales to some Arab nations has hurt itself politically. Since 1973, the United States has reversed that policy and now sells arms to almost all the Arab nations, including some that have received Soviet arms. Unseemingly, the escalating price of oil that resulted from the 1973 oil embargo has helped the United States in this strategy. Because of increased oil revenues, the Arab nations have been able to purchase

more American arms than would have been possible prior to 1973. This has relieved the American taxpayer from supplying these weapons through direct grants. Thus, the rising Arab oil prices have helped to counter Soviet intrusions into the Middle East by providing revenue with which to purchase American arms.

In examining the Arab-Israeli conflict, the issue of Middle East oil, and the Soviet threat, it is evident that all three of these issues must be examined from a historical perspective in order to more fully understand how these issues affect present United States foreign policy in the Middle East. This thesis has presented an in depth historical analysis of these three major issues affecting American foreign policy in the Middle East. Those individuals involved in implementing United States foreign policy in the Middle East should now have a clearer understanding of how American foreign policy has been shaped by these issues.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242,338

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Nov. 22, 1967

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further the necessity*

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, Oct. 22, 1973

The Security Council

1. *Calls* upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls* upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

APPENDIX B
TEXT OF CAMP DAVID PEACE TREATY

Text of Agreements Signed September 17, 1978

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its

neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.*

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government

*The texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are annexed to this document.

and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

—Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neigh-

borly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority

to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the

inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three

months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- (a) full recognition;
- (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure re-

spect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government
of the Arab
Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

For the Government
of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

ANNEX

Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1. *Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:*

(i) *Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;*

(ii) *Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;*

2. *Affirms further the necessity*

(a) *For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;*

(b) *For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;*

(c) *For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;*

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting, on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such

removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all

Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east to El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government
of the Arab
Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

For the Government
of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

APPENDIX C
TEXT OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY

TEXT OF THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN
PEACE TREATY

Following is the text of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to be signed in three capital cities:

Treaty of Peace Between
The Arab Republic of Egypt
And the State of Israel

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and
the Government of the State of Israel;

Preamble

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security; convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel:"

Article I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

Article II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

Article III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;

c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each

Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

Article IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the

Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for mutual settlement of all financial claims.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

done at _____ this _____
day of _____ of 1979, in duplicate in the
Arabic, English and Hebrew languages, each text being
equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

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